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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1776



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THIRTY YEARS OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION WITH USSR REVIEWED

East Berlin DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK in German Vol 24 No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 31 Oct 79 pp 5-12

[Article by Helmut Ziebart, ambassador, department chief in GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs: "Balance Sheet of a Friendship"]

[Text] Friendship with the Soviet Union is a cornerstone of our country's policy. Since the establishment of the first German workers and farmers state the party and government leadership of the German Democratic Republic have assigned the highest priority to the development of friendly relations with the country of Lenin.

In his address celebrating the 30th anniversary Erich Honecker stressed that "supported by the indestructible alliance with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries...we have advanced decade by decade."¹

Continuity as well as steadily more meaningful deepening and increasing variety traced the advanced of governmental and social cooperation in the past 3 decades.

According to the SED program, the SED is guided in the organization of its fraternal cooperation with the CPSU by the fact "...that the vital interests of the German Democratic Republic as the socialist state of workers and farmers agree with the interests of the Soviet Union and the socialist community of nations. It (the SED--author's note) assumes that the German Democratic Republic can accomplish its historic tasks only in cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist fraternal countries."²

This realization has its profound origin in Marxism-Leninism, the scientific ideology of the working class, and in the wealth of experiences gained by the revolutionary German workers movement. It corresponds to the legacy of Ernst Thaelmann and other eminent representatives of the German people. By our policy of fraternal friendship with the Soviet Union we are implementing the ideals for which thousands of German communists and antifascists gave their lives. We are acting in the spirit of the 20 million Soviet citizens who died a hero's death in the great patriotic war for the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascism, including the German people; we are also

acting in the interest of present and future generations. As Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev stated in his speech (which received worldwide publicity) on the occasion of the GDR's 30th anniversary celebrations, here are "preserved and pursued the best traditions of the German workers movement, realized the ideals of a magnificent constellation of German revolutionaries, humanists and philosophers."³

The 30 years of successful GDR development would have been impossible without the presence of the Soviet Union and its political, economic and military aid to our country.

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany has always quite clearly proclaimed that the successes accomplished by the GDR, our great achievements are based on the steady deepening of relations with the USSR. The party of Lenin and the Soviet people have at all times given us their friendly counsel and fraternal aid.

The alliance with the Soviet Union and the combined strength of the Warsaw Pact helped us reliably to defend the independence and sovereignty of the GDR against all attack, foil the diplomatic blockade of imperialism and other machinations of the enemy, and consolidate the international status of the GDR.

The theoretical and practical experiences of the CPSU and the Soviet state in building socialism-communism and the international class conflict have been and continue of inestimable value for us.

In recent years the fraternal cooperation of the GDR and the USSR, beneficial to both peoples, has achieved such a high standard that its pulse is literally felt in all sectors of social life.

The decisive element--again and again lending wings to our relations--is the loyal cooperation between the SED and the CPSU, their central committees and general secretaries. In recent years many meetings joined Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Erich Honecker and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev met no less than 11 times since the signature of the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance of 7 October 1975. Discussed and settled at these meetings were the basic issues of cooperation and the main trends of the development of relations between the two parties and states. The regular talks between the leading representatives of the GDR and the USSR enabled us to utilize the CPSU's wealth of knowledge in the creative application of Marxism-Leninism in the practice of the socialist build-up in the GDR and its international policy.

An outstanding expression of our alliance with the Soviet Union was the official visit of friendship by a USSR party and government delegation, led by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on the occasion of

the 30th anniversary of the GDR. The sojourn of the Soviet party and government delegation in the GDR turned into a demonstration of firm and fraternal ties which unite the peoples of our two countries.

The presence of such a representative Soviet party and government delegation at our anniversary celebrations and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev's speech--so immensely important for peace and international cooperation--including the new disarmament and detente proposals agreed with the party and state leadership of the GDR and the other states of the Warsaw Pact, proclaim the resolution of the USSR, the GDR and other fraternal countries consistently to pursue their efforts to "change Europe from a Continent of tensions and wars into a region of stable peace and mutually beneficial cooperation."⁴

By the proposals of their most senior representatives the USSR and the GDR made a constructive contribution to the settlement of topical international issues which adversely affect security and peace. Together with the other countries of the socialist community both countries will continue to make every effort to further strengthen the process of detente and change the international balance of power in favor of the forces of peace and progress.

The "Joint Communiqué on the Results of the Official Visit of Friendship" and the "Program of Specialization and Cooperation Between the GDR and the USSR Through 1990" represent agreements on two documents which are of the utmost political and economic significance for the further development of relations between our countries.

On the threshold of the 1980's the GDR may look back on more than 3 decades of successful cooperation with the USSR. Its first stage began in 1945 and involved the removal of material and ideological debris, continued by way of the introduction of antifascist-democratic government organs, the restarting of the economy, the antifascist-democratic transformation, the transfer of all administrative functions to the first GDR Government and to the initiation of diplomatic relations between the country of the Soviets and the young German workers and farmers state in October 1949. Later came the early 1950's with the first treaties and actions to flesh out reciprocal relations and the following stage of the constant expansion of cooperation, the deepening of friendship and long-range comradely cooperation for the mutual benefit.

The basic treaties concluded in 1955, 1964 and 1975 were important staging points in the consolidation of fraternal relations between the two parties, states and peoples.

A qualitatively new stage of all-round fraternal cooperation with the party and the country of Lenin was achieved in the years following the Eighth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Its outstanding features are the following:

1. The brotherhood-at-arms of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is substantially strengthened because it is at the heart of mutual relations.
2. International cooperation increasingly acquires a comprehensive nature. It is more and more planned for the long term, regularly coordinated and more purposefully oriented to the common resolution of matured issues.
3. In accordance with social progress and the principles of socialist economic integration both countries reinforce their efforts for the efficient utilization and coordination of material and intellectual capacities for the accomplishment of important economic tasks for the benefit of the GDR and the USSR. The interlinking of their economies is expanding in accordance with the new trends of the productive forces.
4. Synchronization and coordination in the fields of foreign affairs and defense are progressively more intensive.
5. Cooperation in ideological and intellectual-cultural matters is being substantially expanded on the basis of long-term agreements.
6. Direct relations between mass organizations, regions, cities and enterprises are experiencing an upward surge. Many relations of friendship are developing by way of regular collective and personal contacts which positively affect the objective process of the gradual adjustment of peoples and states.

An important basis for this new stage in relations is offered by the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance of 7 October 1975. It is the common program of action for the coming decades and the most important international foundation of cooperation by the two states and peoples. Four years have passed since the solemn signature of this treaty. They have shown that it is excelling in practice. Since its conclusion cooperation at all levels and in all spheres has further advanced. Its implementation opens up new dimensions of the fraternal relationship which benefits the contractual partners and encourages the objective process of the gradual adjustment of both states and peoples. This is reflected, for example, in the conclusion of 50 government agreements and the joint space project Salut 6--Soyuz 31.

The deepening of socialist economic integration between our countries is progressing dynamically. The development of a completely new plasma melting process, the design and planning of modern chemical plants and other examples demonstrate the usefulness and the potential of our cooperation. In recent years we have succeeded in including in our collaboration new and important fields of scientific-technological progress such as microelectronics, device construction and computer processing techniques.

A particularly significant contribution to the implementation of the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance of 7 October 1975 is the

program of production specialization and cooperation between the GDR and the USSR for the period through 1990, signed on 5 October 1979.

Fundamental political and economic significance may be seen in the fact that both countries have at this time developed this long-range and comprehensive program for the development of mutual economic relations. Once again the world may note that the adjustment of our countries economies is steadily advancing as well as irreversible. Proof was given of the fact that our countries are accepting the challenges of our time and actively endeavor to master the problems presented by the complex world economic situation.

The program pursues the intention of combining our material resources and intellectual potential for the joint accomplishment of important economic tasks which point far into the future. It defines for a term of 10 years the strategic directions and main tasks of the division of labor between the GDR and the USSR, and strives to improve the effectiveness of social production and the standard of living of the two peoples.

The fulfillment of the program in terms of cooperation and the division of labor will help more quickly to achieve scientific-technological top status and standards, especially in fields of major economic affect such as the further development and use of microelectronics, the preparation of new technologies and plants for the production of energy, the efficient use of solid fuels and the application of progressive manufacturing technologies. It serves to further strengthen the material-technical basis of production, especially in the raw material and fuel sectors, the purposeful specialization and cooperation of production, the efficient manufacture of finished products.

The economic cooperation planned through 1990 is generally designed to give priority to the more efficient and speedier development of those sectors of the GDR economy, which are crucial for our economic development.

Plan coordination for the period 1981-1985 was pursued in close connection with the preparation of the program.

The program and plan coordination serve in the long term and comprehensively to link the GDR economy with the advanced and major industrial and economic potential of the USSR. We are here supported by a sound tradition. As we all know, economic cooperation between the GDR and the USSR is based on more than 100 government or ministerial agreements. The GDR does 36 percent of its foreign trade with the USSR.

Foreign trade turnover between the GDR and the USSR rose from R215 million in 1949 to R7.5 billion in 1978. Both in the year of the GDR's establishment and the year prior to its anniversary this represented more than a third of our country's total foreign trade turnover. Ever since the establishment of our state the Soviet Union has been our largest and most important foreign trade partner by far. Since 1957 our republic has also held first place in the foreign trade of the USSR. The exchange of goods expanded particularly briskly after the eighth party congress. In 1970 the increase

amounted to R4.2 billion. That nearly corresponded to the value of the exchange of goods between the two countries in 1974. The volume of the exchange of goods in 1977 and 1978 combined, at R14.5 billion, corresponded to the volume of the exchange of goods in the 5-year plan period 1966-1970 (R14.1 billion). In 1978 the GDR purchased from the USSR machines, equipment, means of transportation such as cranes, excavators and trucks which were of the utmost importance for the stable development of our republic's economy. Also among the imports were 17.7 million tons of oil, 3.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 2.95 million tons of rolled steel, 1.36 million tons of iron ore and major deliveries of nonferrous metals, lumber, cellulose, cotton and asbestos. The Soviet meets 100 percent of the GDR's import needs of natural gas, nearly 90 percent of oil, about 75 percent of iron ore, roughly 80 percent of nonferrous rolled metals, 70 percent of zinc, 60 percent of aluminum, more than 90 percent of lumber and cotton.

By its exports to the USSR the GDR significantly contributes to the equipment of Soviet factories with modern technology, to the improvement of the availability of consumer goods and to the mechanization of Soviet farming. Exports include electronic data processing installations, mowing machines, cotton combing machines, automatic telephone exchanges, machine tools, materials handling equipment, machines and plant for the chemical, food and light industries, rail vehicle construction and shipbuilding. The GDR supplies 20 percent of all Soviet imports of machines, equipment and products of the electronic and electrical engineering industries. For the import of forging and pressing equipment the percentage is 40, of equipment for the essential and nonessential food industry more than 30.

The continuing growth of foreign trade between the two countries is already at a very high level and accompanied by a qualitative change in its structure. In the years 1950-1978, for example, the proportion of machines and equipment in the total exchange of goods GDR-USSR rose from 20 percent to 48 percent.

Our republic is involved in the construction and extension of 14 industrial projects, including the cellulose combine at Ust-Ilimsk by the supply of metal structures for the factory buildings; also in the construction of the asbestos processing combine at Kiyembai and the development of new raw material deposits. We are, for instance, supplying plant to the west Siberian oil complex in the Tyumen region for the primary processing of oil and equipment for the pumping stations.

The development of reciprocal exports and imports is already largely determined by specialization and cooperation. The largest share here is held by products of machine construction, electrical engineering/electronics and the chemical industry. The contracts and agreements concluded by the two countries provide a great deal of long-term security for the steady supply of raw materials, semi-finished products, modern machines and equipment to the GDR economy. On the other hand our economy also has a long-term secure market for many of its exports. Exported to the USSR, for example, are

80 percent of all passenger rail coaches produced in the GDR, 10 percent of ships and automatic telephone exchanges, 60 percent of refrigerated vehicles and 50 percent of all cold forming machine tools.

In the intellectual-cultural field also the last few years witnessed an immense advance which helped to bring closer to the peoples of the two countries the wealth of our respective national cultures. Of greatest importance here were the days of culture organized this year in the USSR from 10-20 October. More than 1,300 cultural and artistic creators appeared at nearly 500 events in more than 100 Soviet cities. Since 1951 we have sent students to the USSR. Currently 3,758 GDR citizens are enrolled in Soviet universities and colleges. Altogether some 14,000 GDR students enjoyed an outstanding technical and political education in the Soviet Union. Firm links on the basis of definite working agreements exist among 53 Soviet and 30 GDR universities and colleges. Currently 464 research topics are being studied jointly. Many of the cadres trained in the USSR are now actively involved in scientific-technological cooperation with the GDR. Seven hundred of these graduates are teaching GDR students, sharing with them their knowledge and experiences.

In 1978 alone GDR publishing houses issued 322 titles ranging from Soviet novels to sociological literature. The regular staging of Soviet films and plays helps a great deal to familiarize us with the intellectual wealth of the Soviet people and encourages the process of intellectually coping with the problems of our time. (In the same period of time 155 GDR books were published in the USSR.)

So far more than 2 million GDR citizens were able as tourists to get acquainted with the lives of Soviet citizens and their achievements. Next year another 250,000 GDR citizens will enjoy that privilege. In the same year 67,000 Soviet citizens will visit our republic.

The roots of friendship with the USSR were planted many decades ago by our Marxist-Leninist parties. They were cultivated and cared for by the best representatives of our people even in the era of fascist barbarism. The profoundly internationalist attitude of the Soviet people who, even at the time of the fascist occupation, distinguished between the Hitler fascists and the German people, helped the SED after 1945 to elevate the spirit of friendship for the Soviet Union from the profession of relatively few people to a matter involving the hearts and actions of millions of GDR citizens. In view of the legacy left behind by German fascism and chauvinism the Socialist Unity Party of Germany may proudly indicate the results of the major transformation, carried by the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, which it achieved jointly with its allies. To constantly deepen our friendship with the Soviet people continues to be at the heart of the international actions of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic.

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Honecker, "The GDR, the Real Fatherland of All Working People," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 7 October 1979.
2. "Programm der SED" [SED Program], Berlin 1976, p 60.
3. L.I. Brezhnev, "The Evolution and Consolidation of the GDR Represent a Historic Victory," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, 7 October 1979.
4. Joint Declaration of the SED Central Committee Politburo and the GDR Council of Ministers, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 17 October 1979.
5. See K. Enkelmann, "Fraternal Alliance Guarantees Secure Future," AUSSEN-HANDEL UdSSR, Moscow 1978, No 6, p 32.

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CSO: 2300

DIVERGENT ROMANIAN, HUNGARIAN VIEWS ON 'TRANSYLVANIAN TREASURES'

Bucharest CONTEMPORANUL in Romanian 29 Feb 80 p 6

[Article by University Professor Dr Vasile Dragut: "Shades of the Past"]

[Excerpts] Not long ago, during 1979, the Meridiane Publishing House published an album of authentic interest on the precious metals trade in Transylvania, with illustrations of the treasures in the Museum of the History of Art (Kunsthistorisches Museum) in Vienna. The authors of the album--Radu Florescu (text) and Ion Micla (photographs)--presented all these treasures for the first time with the intention, stated in the introduction, of making them known in their entirety, both by detailed descriptions and by rich illustrations in drawings and photographs.

One fact is evident from the analysis of each item or group of items in the treasure collection--in the Carpathian area, the art of metals has ancient traditions. It was practiced with talent and originality by the Dacians and then by the Romans and Daco-Romans and, in the same area, several centuries later, the achievements from the period of the migrations of peoples would be introduced. Of course, from period to period, in accordance with the ethnic groups which have created them, the treasures preserved--in Transylvania and in the rest of the country--present differences in workmanship, decorative style and subject matter. But it is no less true that these treasures show a process of continuity in the extraction and processing of metals, trades which the migrating peoples would benefit from in their ephemeral periods of domination. Correctly observing that the territorial distribution of the treasures from the period of the migrations must be connected with the traditional economic structures and roads resulting from the natural framework, Radu Florescu calls attention to another aspect which can be explained only by the continuity of the indigenous population, the only one capable of preserving such structures.

A detailed presentation of the imposing treasure of Simleu Silvaniei, with its Germanic character resulting from the taste of the silent partner unequivocally acknowledged, demonstrates the beginning of a process of Romanization of the migrants under the badge of close connections with the Roman Empire. Let us not forget the fact (which has not been adequately utilized by historians) that the Emperor Constantine reestablished Roman control north of the Danube and that in 328 he participated personally in the inauguration of the Oescus-Colei bridge, the work of the Engineer Theophilus.

in regard to the other great treasure presented in the album--the treasure of Sinnicalaul Mare--the text contains a detailed comparison of old and new opinions and finally reaches the conclusion that the items in this treasure were made in the first half of the 11th century by masters from the caliphate of the Abbasids. The treasure of Sinnicalaul Mare certifies, above all, the level of the economic and social development of the indigenous Romanian society.

Despite the obvious qualities of the album under discussion and despite the fact that it is a very useful work tool, with the methodological merit of leaving some possibilities open for discussion, some ideas have been expressed which show that the shades of the past can still make their appearance under the signature of persons who do not like historic truth.

Under the pretext of a review of the album "Tesaure transilvane" [Transylvanian Treasures] the literary-cultural review TISZATAJ [published in Szeged, Hungary] (No 1/1980) published an item whose author, Edith Bardos, would like to convince the readers that there was no indigenous population in Transylvania before the arrival of the migratory peoples, holding that "the pre-supposed indigenous population has no types of relics which could be cited in comparison with the well-defined archeological material of the Huns, Goths, Gepidae, Avars, Bulgarians and Hungarians."

The author writes that the album is concerned with "presenting the treasures originating from the territory of historic Hungary," forgetting to point out that the treasures in question predate the arrival of the Hungarians in these parts of Europe and that the Romanian lands in the inter-Carpathian area have never been Hungary. As is known, Transylvania unceasingly preserved the traditional institution and autonomy of the voivodship, like the other Romanian feudal states. Even after the battle of Mohacs (1526) when Hungary was transformed into a Turkish pashalik, Transylvania continued to exist with its old institutions.

For Edith Bardos, the indigenous population comes from the domain of the "imagination of Romanian historiography." Ignored, with obvious interest, are the detailed reports of the anonymous notary of King Bela who describes, with an abundance of details, the battles of the Hungarians with the armies of the Romanian voivodes Menumurut and Gelu, the besieging of the strongholds of Bihor and Satmar, not once mentioning the large number of residents. And if Gelu was a Wallachian, as the chronicle of the Notary expressly states, and if the basic toponymy of Transylvania--with the principal waterways--is of Romanian origin, all this remains forgotten by Edith Bardos who does not reconcile herself to the existence of an indigenous population.

It should also be pointed out that Edith Bardos, either out of ignorance or intentionally, states that there is a lack of archeological evidence of the indigenous--that is, Romanian--population in Transylvania. We do not propose to make an inventory here of the numerous archeological discoveries which demonstrate, unequivocally, the process of the uninterrupted continuity of the indigenous inhabitants. In Cluj, Turda, Bratei, Biertan and Biharea,

archeological evidence speaks about the existence of firm settlements of a Latin and Christian population, which could not be any of the transient conquerors which Edith Bardos mentions with such zeal.

The author of the review accuses Radu Florescu of "marriem," of that "marriem" which "propagates the idea that each people was formed on the territory on which it currently lives, thus denying the factor of migration." The accusation is askew. In fact, the text of the album "Transylvanian Treasures" speaks about the role of the migrations, recognizes the Germanic paternity of the treasure of Simleul Silvaniei, and admits the possibility that the donor of the treasure of Sinnicolaul Mare might have been a Bulgarian. What irritates the author in question is the demonstration of the fact that the migrants might have been persuaded or influenced by an indigenous population, that very population which Edith Bardos questions. In the spirit of this review, one would have to believe that the Vandals were more important for the history of France than the Gallic-Roman population or that the Heruli were more important than the Romanic inhabitants in Italy.

The fact that Edith Bardos has a very narrow view of the history of this part of Europe is evident in her unconcealed regret at "the loss of the principal Transylvanian treasures." We might ask: who were the creators of these treasures, who labored to extract the precious mineral from the rock, who labored for the splendor of the medieval castles? Obviously, they were not the princes or the feudal lords, regardless of nationality. The serfs of the indigenous population, to whom were added the Hungarian and Szekler serfs, were the ones who labored. It was natural that these treasures would remain in Transylvania and would come back to the people who toiled for them with their own blood.

Today when, through the common efforts of Romanians, Hungarians, Szeklers, Saxons and members of the other national minorities, all Romania is prospering as never before, the stirring up up of such "theories," bred on untruth and nurtured on ill will, can only be a disservice to the noble cause of harmony among peoples. Romanians and Hungarians have suffered too much in the past--sometimes because of unfortunate feuds--to desire a return to those shades which the present and the future do not, under any circumstances, need.

The theses set forth by Edith Bardos in her false review belong to the past. Let us leave them there.

CSO: 2700

FIDELITY OF HUNGARIAN MINORITY POET TO ROMANIA HAILED

Cluj-Napoca STEAUA in Romanian Dec 79 p 63

[Article by Peter Marosi: "The Neighbors of Kanyadi"]

[Excerpt] Sandor Kanyadi, one of the top Hungarian poets in Transylvania, a poet who recently reached the "critical" age of 50, is characterized in the textbooks in the Hungarian secondary schools in Romania as the closest "neighbor" of the great Petofi. This proximity is based, in part, on a geographic fact. Kanyadi was born and began school in Porumbeni Mari Commune in Barghita County--a commune very close to Albesti Commune, near Icliuara, where a marker reminds us of the death of Sandor Petofi, after a final desperate battle of the revolutionary army led by General Bem. This proximity probably had a lasting effect on the poet Sandor Kanyadi. He has traveled a long and complicated road in our poetry but he has never forgotten and never betrayed his first friends.

Sandor Kanyadi has the same devotion to his first Romanian friends. He is one of the most skillful Hungarian translators of Romanian poetry. Sandor Kanyadi is not a servile translator. For him, translation is not a gesture of courtesy or of protocol. For Sandor Kanyadi, proximity, kinship with certain Romanian poets has never been a matter of a tactic or a condition of our literary life. Sandor Kanyadi has his strategy as a translator of Romanian poetry. He knows history and knows that the fact that Romanians and Hungarians lived together at the foot of the Carpathians and in the fields of Transylvania is a matter of history which only people who have lost their elementary sense of humanity and reality can fail to realize.

What linked Sandor Kanyadi so closely with his colleague Ioan Alexandru? In a very simplistic manner, we might say that the common fate of the Romanian and Hungarian peasant in Transylvania was the principal source of the affection of Kanyadi for Alexandru--and in addition: their common desire that their people would build their road to the peaks of modern culture, to the peaks of universal culture.

The roots of friendship between A. E. Baconsky and Sandor Kanyadi should also be sought in this direction. The young Szekler, newly-arrived in Cluj, with a remarkable lyrical talent and with a strong desire for artistic affirmation, found in the chief editor of STEAUA the human-professional voice which he needed.

Sandor Kanyadi does not leave and does not betray his good neighbors, those whom he has begun to call his own. A remarkable example of this artistic fidelity is a new volume of A. E. Baconsky, published in Hungary this year by the Europe Publishing House in Budapest, with the title "Onarckep az idoben" [Self Portrait in Time]. The poems were selected, translated and prefaced by Sandor Kanyadi.

With this volume, A. E. Baconsky has become more accessible to Hungarian readers in Hungary and the tablou of modern Romanian poetry in the Hungarian libraries has become richer. And, what is more, we can see a new evidence of the fidelity of Sandor Kanyadi toward his neighbors, who receive him with a gesture of brotherhood.

CSO: 2700

WFTU DELEGATION HEAD CRITICIZES MEDIA ON AFGHANISTAN

Prague CTK in English 1525 GMT 14 Mar 80 LD

[Text] Prague--The international community must ensure that Afghanistan has all possibilities of further democratic development, unmolested by imperialist sponsored counter-revolutionary gangs, Madhaven Atchuthan, head of a World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) mission to Afghanistan from February 20-29 said at a press conference here on Friday.

The WFTU expresses serious concern over the deliberate distortion of facts about events in this developing non-aligned country, which is a U.N. member. This has once again raised the need for a new international information order and a collective action at the UNESCO and other U.N. agencies to prevent the imperialist-controlled mass media from misleading the world public, Madhaven Atchuthan stressed.

He criticized the melodramatic presentation and the hostile propaganda in some Western mass media, influenced by the imperialist-controlled broadcasting and wire services, especially about the incidents in Kabul in February.

In Kabul, there was an attempt at rioting, looting of shops and damaging of public property on February 21-22.

These provocative and subversive actions were apparently planned and organized by agents who infiltrated Kabul. U.S.- and Chinese-made arms seized from them showed who they were working for, Madhaven Atchuthan said.

This was clearly an attempt to destabilize the situation and an example of crude interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is not a poor country, but a country made poor by imperialism and neo-colonialism. The 1978 revolution threw away these shackles. Imperialism spearheading counterrevolution wants to throttle the Afghan revolution.

The revolution created conditions for the implementation of radical land reforms and for overcoming cultural backwardness, for modernizing economy and for a democratic social development, Madhaven Atchuthan stressed.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CPCZ IDEOLOGICAL WEEKLY DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT CHURCH POLICY

AU121155 Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 10, 5 Mar 80 pp 8, 9 AU

[Article by Frantisek Laburda: "Joint Vital Interests"]

[Excerpts] Each Czechoslovak citizen can, according to his own inner convictions, profess any religion he wants, or he may profess no religion at all and be an atheist. From the viewpoint of the state it is a personal affair of the citizen. No state organ or economic organization requires from citizens data on their religious conviction: the questionnaires and documents of individual state and economic organs do not have a requirement for such data, nor is it even registered in a census.

The Free Activity of the Churches

A total of 18 churches and religious societies operate in Czechoslovakia with the approval of the respective state organs. These are: the Roman Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church, the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, the Jewish Church, the Church of Czech Brethren, the Evangelical Church, the Union of Brethren, the Silesian Evangelical Church of the Augsburg denomination, the Christian Reform Church in Slovakia, the Methodist Church, the Baptist Church, the Unitarian Church, the Church of the Seventh-Day Adventists, the Old Catholic Church, the Neo-apostolic Church, the [Interdenominational] Christian Communities [Krestanske Sbory] and the Greek Catholic Church.

These churches employ almost 5,000 clergymen, pastors, preachers and other persons for whom the spiritual activity in the church or in the religious society is a profession. According to the law on the insurance of the economic basis of churches of 1949, the state extends to them salaries, differentiated according to the church office held. Clergymen also have health and social insurance.

The clergymen are being trained for their profession at six theological university departments: in the academic year 1978-1979 these were attended by almost 400 students. The cost of education is covered by the state; the state also takes care of the social insurance of the students of theological university departments.

The churches and religious societies have more than 8,000 churches, chapels, prayer halls and other assembly facilities at their disposal. In the Czech Socialist Republic, for instance, there are 94 church objects per district, 84 of them Roman Catholic. Every year hundreds of millions of korunas are earmarked from the state budget for the care of cultural and historical monuments. A considerable part of those funds is designated for the maintenance and repairs of churches; in the year 1978, for instance, approximately KCS164 million were spent for those purposes.

In Czech or Slovak publishing houses the churches publish various religious literature, for example, theological treatises, books of prayer, bibles and periodicals. A total of 26 church weeklies, monthlies and other periodicals are being published in Czechoslovakia, some of them in considerable editions; that is true especially of the Czech and the Slovak KATOLICKE NOVINY.

The socialist society has thus created good conditions for insuring in practice the freedom of religion in our state. In socialist Czechoslovakia no one has ever been prosecuted or punished for his religious belief or because he performed religious acts. On the other hand, however, the state could not permit religious freedom to be misused, in contradiction to the law.

The victory of the progressive forces in February of 1948 went against the grain of some figures in the religious circles who could not reconcile themselves to the onslaught of the state of socialist construction. Toward the end of the forties and at the beginning of the fifties the law-enforcing organs discovered a number of cases where church officials had violated the valid laws of the state and had to answer for such violations, just as any other citizen.

The church officials who lent themselves at that time to illegal activities acted not only against the legal order of the state but also separated themselves from the overwhelming majority of the believers.

Support for Our Policy

The believing citizens appreciate the scope the socialist society has created for the implementation of religious freedom. They support the policy of the CPCZ, of the national front and of the government because they have convinced themselves that this policy--although it proceeds from a different world-view basis-- corresponds to the vital interests of the believer.

CSO: 2400

CULTURAL ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS ASSESSED

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 15 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by Janos Gero: "The Role of the Intelligentsia in Popular Culture"]

[Text] Recently, the National Council of Public Education has held a debate on an important topic: The position and role of the intelligentsia in popular culture. Earlier, each member of the Council has received a 60 page report, which has been prepared by a Working Committee under the chairmanship of Imre Pozsgay, the Minister of Cultural Affairs.

Upon hearing about this 60 page report, the reader may raise his head. Why in the world did they have to prepare such a long report, requiring so much effort? In all honesty, one cannot always approve the preparation and multiplication of such lengthy reports, which often simply repeat well-known facts, without saying anything new. In this instance, however, that's not the case. The Working Committee has produced something fresh and original, not only on the specified theme, but also concerning the position, current role, and world-view of the intelligentsia.

The Increased Role

By now it is a well-known fact that industrialization and the socialist reorganization of agriculture has increased the ratio of the intelligentsia within the population, and that its professional and social composition has also changed qualitatively. The education of teachers, engineers, physicians, economists, and agricultural experts has increased especially rapidly. Moreover, within the intelligentsia's rank, the proportional increase of female diploma-holders is almost incredible. Today, out of a hundred students at institutions of higher learning, fifty are women. But the role of the intelligentsia has also increased in other ways. Thus, the works of authors are being put out by state publishing houses. The creations of artists are being shown at official art exhibits. New orientations are being aided by theaters and film studios. And the classical achievements of culture are being made available to millions through radio and television. But even beyond all this, such organizations

as the Society for the Popularization of Knowledge, the labor unions, the Patriotic People's Front, various "free universities" and "workers' academies," as well as the Movement for Reading People, are well encouraging their members and participants to receive and to popularize culture.

Naturally, this type of effort to spread popular knowledge among the people is not without precedence in our country, which has also been recognized by the report. Progressive Hungarian intellectuals have always regarded it their goal to do away with the blank spots of culture. Today's intelligentsia is simply continuing the traditions of Ervin Szabo, Zsigmond Moricz, Zoltan Kodaly, and Peter Veres. This is especially true for the thousands of professional educators, librarians, directors of cultural centers, museologists, as well as for directors of clubs and of folk dancing centers. But there are also many other specialists who view the popularization of universal and national cultural values as part of their obligations. These include archeologists who initiate hundreds of young people into the secrets of their discipline; agricultural experts who lecture at collective farms on topics other than their specialties; and four-thousand presidents of circles of local history and knowledge about the fatherland. They are familiarizing people with the problems of the past and the present, and they all play the role of the intelligentsia in the popularization of culture.

Not All Specialists Are Members of the Intelligentsia

"The intelligentsia constitutes to be a social category," asserts one of the paragraphs of the 60 page report. And this is undoubtedly true. "In our society, all those are classified as members of the intelligentsia, who, through professional activities, produce intellectual values; who make the systematic application of this accumulated knowledge possible; who participate in the transmission of cultural values, and of general and specific disciplinary skills; and who are either among the leaders or among the experts of such decision-making and executive functions that require a high level educational preparation."

Being a member of the intelligentsia, therefore, implies a certain amount of education. Yet, not everyone with a college or university education can be classified as such. Thus, administrators and accountants, who are active only in their areas of specialty, or members of the health professions who are not involved in the production of new cultural values, nor in the creation and dissemination of new professional skills cannot be regarded as being members of the intelligentsia.

But there are also some examples for the other side. Involvement in literature and in movements can also produce intellectuals who lack "official documents," such as Peter Veres, Lajos Kassak, or Istvan Sinka in literature. This applies equally to specific cities or villages. True, intellectualism is closely connected with a diploma. But there are always exceptions to the rule, such as painters, writers, sculptors, archeologists,

and leaders of cultural centers who have become what they became purely through their own efforts. I can still remember the librarians of the radical reading center of my own village; old man Kovacs and Butykos Szabo. Both of them were small-holding peasants who introduced me to Attila Jozsef, Soholov, and the works of the Populist writers already before the Liberation. They were better read and more informed than the teacher of our village.

Scope and Publicity

To be a member of the intelligentsia means at the same time a way of life, a certain attitude, and serving as an example to others. Obtaining a diploma is only the start of something. Sadly enough, many individuals fail to progress beyond this point. They regard the official document as a status symbol. Instead of assuming the obligations of an intellectual, they simply take on the behavioral pattern of the intelligentsia. They fail to continue their self-education, and remain bogged down far removed from reality.

A true intellectual is always present in the field of his discipline in an exemplary manner. He follows developments there, he augments his knowledge, and he also makes an effort to pass on this knowledge to others. One of the best means of accomplishing this is the professional debate, whether it's done in a written or oral form. Professional debates are always manifestations of the workings of democracy. Publicity and the clashing of individual views are catalysts to progress. If we claim that, at least to a certain degree, democracy means publicity, then we can also add with assurance that publicity is simultaneously the action field of the intelligentsia. It is in all of our interests that this field be ever extended, ever more accepted, and ever more common.

In today's world, decision-making in all areas of human activity requires the knowhow of the intelligentsia. Examples of the Csepel Works, Videoton, and Babolna are of legendary fame; and we could continue this list with no difficulty. Neither county councils, nor party committees make any serious decisions without asking for the advice of the specialists. And this is also true for the highest levels as well. Various groups of scholars and scientists, and a legion of advisers prepare reports and surveys, and recommend changes in all areas of our economic and cultural life.

The Determining Influence of those with Workers' Backgrounds

It has been a traditional goal of all Hungarian progressive movements to institutionally continue the education of the children of manual workers. With the triumph of socialism this goal became a reality. This achievement, however, has produced the consensus among many that now everything is in order, and that we have done everything in this area. But this is not true!

It is still imperative today that the ranks of the intelligentsia be replenished by the children of manual workers. It was true in the past,

and it is still true today that one's childhood and family experience exert a determining influence on the individual. Thus, those who stemmed from the ranks of the manual workers are naturally more sensitive to the "silent" trends among them, i.e. to the problems and joys of their original social class. They are the ones in the best position to sense most quickly various problems in political life, if for whatever reason, there is a social malaise among the masses.

Although many students of night schools and correspondence courses fail, and although the whole system is in need of reform, we still must admit that this type of education has proven to be worthwhile. It affords the chance to many physical workers to move into the intellectual field; which would have been impossible without this type of educational system. It is still not easy today for a physical worker to secure for himself an intellectual career. This is substantiated by many surveys and studies. As an example: All surveys indicate that the proportion of physical workers is much higher in the primary schools than in secondary school institutions, particularly in the gymnasiums. This also holds true for the night schools and the correspondence courses, where students of working class background considerably outnumber those of other class origins.

But there is some even more interesting data: In the medical and the legal professions, for example, children of highly educated parents constitute an absolute majority. At the same time, the majority of the students in fields that are less desirable both professionally and economically are of lower class origins. And if one leaves Budapest and proceeds toward the villages, then the proportion of children with lesser educated parents increases correspondingly. The proportion of higher education parents, however, declines. Simultaneously, even among those who come from small communities, the ones with better family backgrounds usually move "up" to the cities; while others with disadvantageous family background find themselves "down" in small towns and villages. On top of all this -- being the first generation intellectual -- the latter also find it more difficult to move up on the social ladder.

Most of the agricultural intelligentsia are of the latter category; and they also face additional obstacles. Because of the more backward system and lower level technology in agriculture, they are associated with people of minimal education. Furthermore, they are obliged to fulfill their goals and their roles as members of the intelligentsia amidst most unfavorable circumstances. These include long work days, lack of holidays, and even the absence of free Saturdays and Sundays. (Livestock does not know such categories.) And if they fail in their jobs (not always because of their own faults), they lack the choice of employment opportunities comparable to those in the cities. They simply have to move along with their families. They work from spring until late fall, fourteen to sixteen hours a day. This limits their opportunity for self-education, and also prevents them from assuming various social-cultural roles. But to continue with the original idea: If one proceeds from Budapest toward the villages, the

proportion of the intelligentsia in the total population decreases gradually. Although a sizable portion of the light industry had already been transferred from Budapest into the provinces, most of the specialists have remained in the capital. This holds true even though they are offered apartments, as well as good pay. No less is this true of physicians. Thus, as one moves toward the villages, so the proportion of the intellectuals decreases. In the capital the ratio of 7.1 per cent, in the provincial cities 4.3 per cent, and in the villages 1.4 per cent. If one adds to all this the trend toward centralization -- to which one may not object, if it is dictated by rationalism -- then one suddenly realizes that the priest remains the only intellectual in the small villages. The schools were combined, and thus the teachers are gone. The agricultural collectives were combined, and thus the agricultural experts are gone. Only the priests remains, along with the handicraft centers, the glee-clubs (religious hymns), and the youth clubs. Today the search is on for an antidote against this phenomenon; and it has already been found in the form of mobile libraries, mobile health centers, enlightenment, mobile theaters and so on.

But this problem exists, and we are obliged to take cognizance of it. The 60 page report mentioned earlier is even richer than this summary indicates, and it calls attention to even more specific details. We hope that the report will receive appropriate publicity, and that those who are competent on this topic will still have a chance to make their views known.

9271

CSO: 2500

CATHOLIC SCHOOLS SOLICIT MAINTENANCE FUNDS

Budapest UJ EMBER in Hungarian 3 Feb 80 p 1

[Article by Sandor Toth, "Our Common Problem: Support for Our Catholic High Schools"]

[Text] Statistics: During the past 30 years, the number of students averaged between 2,000 and 2,300 in each of our 8 Catholic high schools. More than 13,000 graduated.

We heard some responsibility-inciting thoughts last Sunday in the encyclical letter of the Bench of Hungarian Catholic Bishops: "It depends on us, faithful Catholics, what the future of our Church will be and whether we are willing to educate in a Christian spirit those who are under our care. In the meantime, we must never forget that we can pass on only what we ourselves value and experience. Planting and tending the seeds is a tiring work which requires concentration. Do we have the courage and are we willing to face our future?"

The cradle shaping the future is the family where, "without the parents' sacrificing love, real faith and hope in the Lord, it is difficult to explain to the children that God is really our divine Father... The family which really teaches the goodness of God to the growing children, is planting in good soil." Our turning to the child is the best proof of our love. The presence of this love is what determines the personality our child will have and who he is going to become. There is a need in this care, first of all, for consistency. There is a need for daily tasks and authentic Christian behavior -- in all areas of our lives. There is a need for constant attention so that the child's growth will be undisturbed.

"Growth is given by God", we heard in the encyclical letter, "but we need workers who educate and transplant the treasure which is called culture and who help growth. The eight catholic schools ... help ripen the home's careful planting ... they expect children who are mature enough for high school studies and who come from a family atmosphere where Christ's gospel is a living reality. These schools can fulfill their tasks only if the monastic teachers realize that they are not left alone with their problems..."

I remember my youth with the Franciscan fathers and when I hear of problems, I see my parents who made the sacrifice which was not easy even with support I received from my diocese. The boarding fee seemed high, even then. But, to size up the situation: how much the costs were frittered away -- I wondered how imaginative my superiors were in providing, from month to month, a carefree student life for us. Since then, of course, the world has changed a great deal and the demands are now also present in the requirements (which are signs of progress). New subjects have been created, and these need new equipment. The buildings became (are becoming) worn. However, our parochial high schools must not lag behind the standards of the secular institutions. The requirements are the same, both here and there. Catching-up is impossible for a lack of money. In the times past, occasional foreign aid and material help from the state (10,000 forints per school) were not sufficient to maintain and up-date the buildings. For this reason, the Bench of Hungarian Bishops, at the request of the monastic orders responsible for the schools, turned to the Catholic population of the country and asked for support. The first collection was in 1977. Since then, it has been repeated every year. This year's encyclical letter, urges and rallies the faithful asking for a financial contribution to help our high schools and emphasizes another very important thing: "We must care for the children of suitable, able and faithful families; they should be willing to apply to a parochial high school. Let us care for the monastic teachers who may become our working partners in case of need..."

As a Christian who thinks of the future of his children, let me pray for the professions. And let me also pray for the profession of my own child(ren). Because one never knows. And can the True Teacher give us a richer reward? My gift includes my prayer. One cannot be without the other.

And when I assume my share in the financial problems of our schools, let me think of the apostolic words, of the Christian meaning of every contribution: "Under the test of this service, you will glorify God by your obedience in acknowledging the gospel of Christ, and by the generosity of your contribution for them and for all others." (2 Cor. 9/13.)

We have reported several times in the columns of our paper that "the test of this service" -- for which our monastic high schools thank us all -- has already provided many things (that is, it was worthwhile!). But no matter how true the saying is, "The word flies away, writing stays", the nature of the newspaper also undermines the validity of the latter: articles dispersed in time are being forgotten. For this reason, we visited Vital Kapuy, a Benedictine monk, and educational official of the Main Catholic High School Authority, and asked him to give us some budget information about the collections to date, about the utilization of these, and to say a few words about the problems and tasks of the future as well.

"The data of the Main Catholic High School Authority show that over the last 3 years collections have totalled 9,330,000 forints. In addition, there was the one-time gift given when American pontiffs visited us in the

fall of 1977, from which 2,733,864 forints were given to the schools. The four monastic orders were given aid, totalling 12,063,864 forints, with the restriction that the entire sum, divided in four equal parts, must be spent on the maintenance of schools and dormitories, and on investments.

"The Gyor high school and residence hall of the Benedictine order spent more than 1,500,000 forints on central heating, on modernizing the study rooms and sleeping quarters of the dormitories, on renovating the classrooms and the assembly hall and on reconstructing the lavatories and the student library. The collections did not entirely cover the expenses, but the shortage of 56,705 forints was made up by special aids.

"The Pannonhalma high school and residence hall has also spent 1,500,000 forints from the three years collections on renovating its building, on internal repairs, on modernizing the classrooms and lecture halls, and on the gradual replacement of dormitory furniture.

"The Ezertergom institution of the Franciscan order has installed a central heating system, started to modernize the sleeping quarters, having spent more than 2,500,000 forints so far. The actual expenditures of 3 million forints were not covered by the collection aid either. They had to use special resources.

"The Szentendre school received a relatively small amount of 360,000 forints from the 3,015,966 forints given to the Franciscan order. This was spent on construction materials, renovation, painting, new floors, new windows. They needed 18,000 forints in addition to the aid. The expenses do not include labor, for a large part of it was done by the teachers and students without compensation.

"The Budapest high school of the Piarist order repaired the roof, and spent 2,061,000 forints on construction, renovation and the installation of the heating system.

"The Kecakemet high school and residence hall received 900,000 forints for central heating, internal renovation and dormitory equipment.

"The remaining 55,000 forints were allocated for the building of a gymnasium.

"The Our Lady School Sisters order divided its grant equally between its institutions in Budapest and Debrecen.

"The cost of installing a central heating system and the resulting masonry work, external and internal renovations, modernization of the lighting and replacement of dormitory equipment at the Budapest high school and residence hall totals almost one-and-a-half million (1,470,672) forints to date.

"The inner and external renovation, the roofing, carpentry and locksmith work, the painting, floor laying, and the acquisition of dormitory cabinets at the Debrecen school and residence hall cost more than one-and-a-half million (1,594,521) forints, so that there was a need, here too, to use special grants. The replacement of the ceiling in one part of the building was a special problem, which resulted in an expenditure of millions.

"When the monastic orders are grateful for the aid of the Bench of Bishops, they must also think of the new tasks. The new educational reform puts new burdens on the schools. With the introduction of elective courses, it is also necessary to design, build and equip new classrooms and other rooms. The maintenance work and the modernization of dormitories already in progress must be continued. Study materials and storage rooms also need further supplements. We fulfill our obligation specified in the agreement of 30 years ago when we create a suitable and appropriate environment for the students of the Catholic high schools and residence halls."

Individual gifts to our Catholic schools may be directed to the following addresses:

Benedictine High School
9090 Pannonhalma
Var utca 1.

Gergely Czuczor Benedictine High School
9022 Győr
Szechenyi ter 8.

Pelbart Temenvari Franciscan High School
2501 Eaztergom
P.O.Box 50.

Franciscan High School
2000 Szentendre
Sallai Imre utca 18.

Piarist High School
1444 Budapest 8
P.O.Box 266.

Piarist High School
6001 Kecskemet
P.O.Box 34.

Patrona Hungariae Girls' High School
1092 Budapest
Knezits utca 5.

Svetits Girls' High School
4024 Debrecen
Beke utja 24.

FRENCH CORRESPONDENT REPORTS ON ECONOMIC REFORM DILEMMA

Realizations After Papal Visit

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Feb 80 pp 1, 5

[Article by Bernard Guetta: "Poland Between Fear and Need for Reform"]

[Text] The Eighth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party will start on Monday, 11 February, in Warsaw. Except for any last-minute changes, none of the leaders of the brother parties--which, with the exception of Mr Ceausescu, were all present in 1975, during the preceding congress--will be attending the meetings. These absences supposedly are due to Mr Brezhnev's fatigue and his failure to attend presumably caused the others likewise to stay away. Less than a week before presenting his report to the delegates, Mr Edward Gierek, last Tuesday, in the name of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, addressed a letter of congratulations to Mr Gomulka on the occasion of his 75th birthday (LE MONDE), 8 February. This unexpected homage, like the one rendered on Thursday in TRIBUNA LUDU, to Mr Rusinek, the labor minister during the Stalinist era, who was also celebrating his 75th anniversary, characterized a desire to affirm party unity during the difficult economic and political period which the country is going through.

I. The Delayed-Action Bomb of Jean Paul II

Warsaw. The subject of the conference--"Sciences and Ideology"--is not at all inspiring. But at 0800, the moment mass was over, the small parish hall was filled and everybody already had his notebook open on his knees and the pencil in his hand. Jan, an assistant at the University of Warsaw, whom the pastor had asked to come to this low-income suburb, sat down on the podium. Totally calm, he began to put on the table a pile of works in epistemology banned by the censorship and published secretly by the opposition. Then came half an hour of introductions and three-quarters of an hour of debate: 75 minutes of solid anti-Marxist polemic. Nobody

had the feeling that anybody was being particularly heroic, of braving some danger which in fact does not exist. This is an almost commonplace scene in the Poland of today, the Poland after the Pope's visit.

The authorities had been looking forward to this visit with anxiety. While thinking that it would be even more dangerous to oppose approval of the visit, they feared the worst: they did not know what kind of earthquake, what ground-swell his passage would produce. The Pope came, the crowds gathered and then dispersed, without incident; the Pope left again, nothing fell apart and everything was back in order. Then the weeks and months passed and everybody realized that everything had in reality changed. As minister of religion Kazimierz Kakol said in somewhat elliptical terms: "There was no structural evolution but one can observe a psychological evolution."

This is true first of all of the Church itself where simple priests at the grass-roots level were encouraged. Yesterday somewhat under the thumb of the primate, often frightened by his run-ins with the powers that be, they are today much more open and engage in the kind of audacities which so far only the opposition would dare come out with. These debates, these lecture cycles, in the course of which people quickly switch from religion to ethics and from ethics to politics, are no longer the exclusive property of university parishes and some convents. Little by little, they are spreading to each parish, drawing away a younger generation with which the entire Polish Church wants to establish the kind of togetherness which Jean Paul II had managed to create in June between him and his audience.

"Some people talk of the triumph of the Church," said Mr Kakol, apparently alluding to the worries which this situation is creating in a part of the apparatus. "For my part, I believe only that it has become more sure of itself because this pope, who enjoyed general esteem, has made everyone forget its conservative image and has given it international prestige." According to the minister of religion, 17,000 applicants--600 more than in 1978--thus turned up at the doors of the seminaries last year, where spaces are scarce.

"The faithful," said the cautious Rev Orszulik, the spokesman of the bishops, "come out of the shadows and are showing themselves to be more courageous. They have awakened and they are more aware of their rights, including their civic rights. The words of the Pope, especially those addressed to the intellectuals, are now a source of reference."

Formidable Machine in Motion

That is putting it delicately. Without noise, without much ado, the formidable machine of the Church has been on the move for the past 7 months. Objective: through the sermons of Cardinal Wyszynski, and in the catechism courses, to spread the message brought by the Pope. Let us call a spade a spade. This is a political program, a mobilization program, at least.

In simple terms, the Church is little by little hammering away at three main points: man and his rights must be at the center of any policy; there can be no order, no work, no patriotism without justice; our fate is inseparable from the sister churches (those in the "brother countries"). What Jean Paul II told his fellow citizens--his sheep for the most part, his fans all the way--is that Poland, such as it now, with its regime, its ideology, its system of alliances, is their country and the best way to show that is to build it; that socialism is their system and that their future will be determined in Central Europe, not in the West. In specific terms, that they should express themselves, that they should not be against the regime but for Poland, for the brotherhood of the peoples of the East and not against an alliance, for the Christian ethic and not against an ideology.

What the Pope told the leaders of the communist state who received him with much pomp and circumstance, is that the Church recognized them, that it supported them so long as they worked for the good of the country but that they would get nothing out of the people without recognizing their rights.

Deep down in social conscience and among the secrecy of political calculations, this message is in the process of imperceptibly changing quite a few things. Starting with the future of relations between the State and the Church. The latter has switched from a defense of its positions to the offense. It no longer demands only the definition of a *modus vivendi* and the recognition of its rights to the souls from the establishment. It wants more: a "suitable place in the current phase of history of our nation," so that, it says, quoting Jean Paul II, it may render man not only "more devoted to his professional and patriotic commitments" but also "more courageous and aware of his rights." Through the effect of a conclave, the Church is in the process of recovering the dynamic concepts of the role of Polish Catholicism advocated until then--from Krakow, the hometown of Cardinal Wojtyla--by the weekly publication TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY and the personality-inspired group called ZNAK, a current which has always caused the government of Poland much worry. This is not an earth tremor, just a slight change in the weather--a phenomenon which sometimes suffices to change a countryside as the years pass.

Disarray in the Offices

But the most spectacular and immediately perceptible evolution which followed the visit of the Pope is to be found elsewhere, in the disarray in the government offices. That journey was highly revealing. It was learned first of all that Poland is not a communist country but a Catholic country, directed by a communist party. But between knowing something and seeing something, between seeking an accord with the Catholic hierarchy and looking at these enthusiastic, feverish crowds, acclaiming the Polish pope in his serene triumph, there was a vast abyss.

From city to city, in solemn mass, with improvised dialogue, it was the gathered people who enabled Jean Paul II to express himself the way he did. An unknown Poland which probably did not emerge in the opposition but certainly not in the government apparatus either. A Poland of the post-war generation, born under this regime which it greatly reproaches for being outdated and discouragingly heavy-handed but which it does not challenge ideologically. In short, a younger generation in search of identity, of truth, of possibilities and prospects which the party itself has never been able to mobilize, which it had not been able to get to fall in line behind it during 35 years in power.

Shoulder to shoulder, lining the way of the Pope, uncontrollable and powerful for 10 days, it never allowed itself for a moment to engage in any manifestation of hostility against the government. That undoubtedly was the mark of political maturity and a sign that the kettle is not as close to boiling over as some people might have wished after the 1976 worker uprising. But there was perhaps also above all here a kind of profound indifference toward the current state of affairs. A little bit something like the spontaneous disdain of those joyful parades of 1968 which, one fine day in May, had struck the French parliament dumbfounded by simply passing it by, without giving it a glance.

On top of the serious economic difficulties besetting Poland, the observation of this vast gap between the real country and the official country created a shock, a crisis of doubt which is rather neatly summarized by the item heading "How To Get Out of It?" in the second "questionnaire" disseminated in January by the semi-opposition group "Experiences and the Future" (DIP). The following joke is being told everywhere at this time: "How can one get out of a situation without any way out?" It was asked on Radio Erivan. Answer: "Unfortunately, we are not concerned with Polish affairs." Yes, indeed, how to get out of this, when the country is doomed to austerity and sacrifices for at least 10 years?

And what about the foreign debt? It is now officially \$17 billion, as against \$7 billion at the end of 1975. It constitutes a heavy burden on the entire economy and threatens to go up even more.

What about the energy shortage? It will not be resolved for a long time and it will be necessary to wait 2 years before the new power plants at Polaniec and Belchatow will help improve the situation. In the meantime, this shortage has caused the country to lose 30 billion zlotys in 1978 (Fl is worth about 7.20 zlotys) and three to four times more in 1979 because of the bad winter which paralyzed activities for a week and damaged 90 percent of the installations. Repairs have been practically completed. ("I can only assure everybody that they have been well carried out," declared Mr Gierek on 9 September of last year.) But restrictions remain drastic and the enterprises are doomed to working below their capacity to pay the workers to do nothing and to put in night shifts wherever they can.

Imports Reduced

What about the foreign trade deficit? An apparent improvement after the abrupt suspension of investments in 1976 made it possible progressively to reduce it from \$3 billion that year to a little more than \$1 billion in 1979. But although this balancing act was marked by an increase in exports, it above all caused a stagnation in value and a drop in the volume of imports. This situation is all the more preoccupying since the share of raw material and cereal purchases increased considerably to the detriment of capital goods. This year, Poland--if the harvest is good--will still have to import a minimum of 7 million tons of cereals, to be added on top of the 50 million tons which, since 1970, have cost it \$8 billion. Even among the most reassuring commentators there are therefore few Polish economists who think that it might be possible to balance foreign trade without reducing imports to the point of endangering the export possibilities and capacities.

If we also take into account the inadequacy of the railroads, which no longer manage to carry the output of the factories and mines, especially all the way to the ports, which no longer manage to load and unload the ships within the required span of time; if we look at the waste and low labor productivity for which there is no remedy; if we look at the quarter of the national budget devoted to subsidizing food prices which nobody dares raise for political reasons; and if we then note the demoralizing and humiliating persistence of long lines in front of the butcher shops and the bakeries, then the situation does not lend itself to looking forward to any wonderful tomorrows.

But these difficulties are nothing new. The beginnings of the crisis go back to 1975 and it has only grown worse because of the exceptionally cold winter. But while it was minimized yesterday, an entire segment of the Establishment--going far beyond the usual circle of liberals--today is dramatizing it, now sure that Poland cannot get out of the tunnel without making structural, economic, and political changes. Nobody has given up yet but everybody is now looking forward to the next step; "reformitis" has taken hold of the political establishment in Warsaw.

Church-State, Opposition, Economics

Paris LE MONDE in French 10-11 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by Bernard Guetta: "Poland Between Fear and the Need for Reform"]

[Text] In his first article (LE MONDE, 9 February), Bernard Guetta showed how, encouraged by the Pope's visit, the Catholic Church in Poland has gone on the offensive while the government, in full disarray, has been seized with "reformitis" because of the difficult economic situation.

II. "Better Not To Win than To Lose"

Warsaw. "The situation is very simple," an intellectual known for his militant loyalty to the regime said. "We thought we were 24 years back, in 1956. We experienced the same frenzy of discussions and meetings in the months that preceded October." The idea is rather forced, but not too much so: the frenzy is real.

Several weeks ago, between 22 November and 3 January the Society of Polish Economists organized a round of debates on the country's situation. It was attended by one vice minister and numerous high officials, in other words, anybody who was somebody in the Polish economy. There was an explosion at the very first session; an uninterrupted wave of criticisms swept along from meeting to meeting. Everybody had only one idea--change; everybody gave the word a different meaning but the more radical the speaker, the more applause he got. "The proposals ranged from a return to orthodox Marxism to extreme Stalinism and all the way to the introduction of pure liberalism such as it was at the end of the 19th century," one of the organizers commented. "But there was unanimity on one point: the current system is bad, it will not enable us to attain our objectives during the years to come."

The echo was the same in every discussion and in every office. "The situation as such is not as desperate as all that. We have what it takes to get out of it," a planning official assured his listeners, mentioning the modernization of the production machinery (more than half of the industrial installations today are less than 5 years old) and the marked rise in the level of education of the younger generation. "But I am sure," he added quickly, "that without a modification in the operation of our economy, we will not be able to utilize this capital."

"We Need a Montesquieu of Socialism"

The deputy editor-in-chief of an economic journal was even more direct; he thought that, to get out of the current difficulties, it would be necessary to start with reforming the central planning setup "because it is what decides everything in our system. We can longer continue to demand that the enterprises each year increase their output without taking into account the purpose behind that output or the price which the country has to pay for it."

Reforms everywhere; reforms always. The situation had reached such a boiling point that it spread even to the strongest bastions of Polish conservatism, the Catholic PAX group, created by the government right after the war as a counterweight to the bishops. "We need a Montesquieu of socialism," said one of its leaders quite frankly, explaining that an economic reform ("naturally necessary") will be severely limited and that it will be necessary to modify the political equilibriums in order "to put an end to this slow decline."

PAX Wants To Play Role

"The compromise between the Church and State," he continued, "is no longer enough for Polish society. The key question now is how the citizens, who are not party members, could share responsibilities with the management of the country and thus participate in public affairs, for our part, we want to assert our position as a left-wing Catholic group, independent from the party and the hierarchy, because I believe that Poland needs that." In other words, PAX wants to play a buffer role as a Catholic party, loyal to the socialist system, but critical and autonomous.

On a full page of the movement's daily, SLOWO POWSZECHNE, dated 5 January, its new president, Mr Ryszard Reiff, just explained to the authorities furthermore that this was also in their interest. "The moral state of society is highly disquieting," he said first of all, before developing his line of argument. To begin with, he wrote in substance, the government no longer has to face only material demands (which, by the way, are difficult to satisfy right now) but also "a desire to enrich community life which is expressed with less and less patience." Secondly, the only way to prevent the "anti-socialist circles" (the opposition) from gaining an audience which they do not yet have among the Catholic masses is to "take the wind out of their sails." Thirdly, Mr Reiff concludes, it is necessary to give a more "authentic" role to the city councils, to parliament, and to the organizations which are not fighting against socialism but "in favor of a socialism under which several views of the world would exist together."

Moving on to action, PAX is making strong efforts to move closer to the bishops; it is quoting the Pope at every turn; it keeps badgering the authorities to get an increase in the number of deputies in the Diet (the elections are scheduled for 23 March) and, at the end of negotiations very much in the style of the "Fourth Republic," it hopes to constitute a common group with the other Catholic organizations represented in parliament. (At this time, the Diet consists of ten Catholic deputies, in other words, four from the PAX group, four from the ZNAK group, and two from the Christian Social Association. Two other seats allocated to the Catholics are currently vacant due to death.) Wrong ("PAX is an incurable movement," the spokesman of the bishops hinted) or right (a man who has the ear of Mr Gierek, Professor Szczepanski, vice president of the Academy of Sciences, is in favor of creating a Catholic party)--the movement believes that it can launch this offensive.

Mr Gierek's Frankness

Question addressed to one of its officers: "Do you have reason to think that the authorities could give you the green light?" Answer, dry: "That is not where the problem is. If we do not work out a form of pluralism, Poland will go the way of Czechoslovakia 10 years ago." With a smile ("I wrap my optimism in my pessimism") a director of the planning institute

says this, in effect: change appears unavoidable because it is a fact of life.

The only trouble is that, no matter how much one may read and re-read the directives for the period of 1981-1985, to be adopted by the congress, or the statements of Mr Gierak, or those of Prime Minister Jaroszewicz, one will not find the slightest prospect of reform in any of these papers. While the political circles in full freedom seek the philosopher's stone, Mr Gierak, more phlegmatic and pragmatic than ever before, makes haste slowly, firmly determine to avoid making waves, with a new weapon in his hand: frankness.

Methodically, since December, from speeches at construction sites to meetings of the Central Committee, talking to the country, he has presented a list of difficulties, he explained every word, he says what is not going to come about for a long time and he describes the hardships of daily life as he had to do his own shopping every morning.

The tone is direct, warm, and although the shower is cold, he does so to make everybody realize that everybody is in the same boat, that the captain has not lost his compass in the storm and that the crew must row hard.

In the meantime, they tried to plug the most serious breaches--those on a market which is increasingly disturbed by bureaucratic aberrations and by the imbalance between supply and demand. Slowly and without any noise--out of fear of explosions--prices keep going up, along with "new" products (in different packaging), the creation of "commercial" stores (better supplied, with higher prices), followed by the lineup of normal prices with commercial prices, as has just happened for "higher-grade" meat. At the same time, private initiative is being promoted through a considerable increase in the number of small commercial establishments which the government allows private individuals to manage freely. Autonomous management experiments, with the possibility of purchasing on the private market, are currently being conducted in several big distribution areas and it is hoped that small and medium industry--which is supposed to be more flexible and more efficient--will thus be given an upswing.

But, due to lack of immediate results, the moment a city begins to grumble, it is supplied on a priority basis, to the point of disorganizing the distribution circuits and even to the detriment of some other part of the country which a few months later will get the same therapeutic treatment. More disquieting for the future, at the first sign of serious demands, ready even further to increase the volume of money in circulation and thus to push the demand, enterprise managers give in and grant wage hikes; above all, there must be no strikes.

But this policy is even more definite in dealing with the opposition. Here, the slogan is "make no waves." That means two things: do not repress

anybody too spectacularly and do not let the rein loose. In just 4 years, since its establishment right after the 1976 uprisings, the principal opposition group, the KOR, was thus able to grow to the point of having about a thousand active militants, setting up a real publishing house which has already published about 50 titles in several thousand copies, being able to count on an impressive network of distributors for the dissemination of the approximately 15 periodicals which it sponsors, and having opened the way for several other movements. Two of them are very different and have acquired by no means negligible significance: the ROPCIO, a nationalist group, and especially the DIP, much more moderate, where we find Catholic intellectuals and party members together.

In just 4 years, the opposition has become a part of Polish life, not only in intellectual circles but also among the workers and peasants, where it has ramifications. But its promoters, harassed by the police, regularly arrested for periods of 48 hours (the legal period for detention) must admit today that there are limits to their actions. The student solidarity committees, which they hoped would grow up in the various colleges, no longer have any real existence; the parallel (in other words, itinerant) university, which they had created, had to interrupt its activities after one year because of repeated incidents organized by "angry students" and the worker and peasant groups remain marginal.

Victim of a success which it has neither the strength nor the liberty to capitalize on, the opposition is now confronted with dangerous tendencies toward activism and just plain overdoing it. Within the KOR, several militants are beginning to find that their "historical leaders," Mr Jacek Kuron and Mr Adam Michnik are simply too conciliatory. Attracted by the nationalism of the ROPCIO, they have so far organized, together with that movement, in the month of December, on the anniversary of the 1970 Gdansk uprisings, a street demonstration (the fifth in 13 months) whose anti-Soviet overtones led to 14 persons being charged.

The bitter internal debates which this initiative has triggered had barely calmed down when a new difference emerged. While the most radical members now propose to launch a campaign to boycott the parliamentary elections, the "evolutionists" want to establish a "citizens commission" supported by a nationwide petition and charged with "giving society a program of what can be done today and tomorrow to improve the situation"--a program which would serve as foundation for future action.

In short, although everybody wants to avoid a rupture, the differences are profound, the prospects are difficult, and a leadership spokesman can say today, visibly satisfied with this situation: "We have learned to live with the opposition. Apart from some extremists, they are after all reasonable people."

Reasonable Opposition

The opposition, like the Church, criticizes and is stepping up its pressure, it is strengthening its influence and it is increasing its demands; this imposes upon the party a de facto pluralism by forcing it to pay attention to the opposition and to the Church although both of them know that they cannot go too far. Beyond outward appearances, beyond economic, political, and moral crises, Poland is a country of profound consensus--on one single but fundamental point: the desire to avoid an explosion which, everybody knows, would turn the whole thing into a bloody drama. Nobody--from Mr Gierk to the opposition, including Cardinal Wyszynski--is ready to pursue the worst-case policy, the policy of confrontation. Everybody today with the same anxiety watches the development of East-West tension in which Warsaw would have everything to lose.

Will this consensus permit Poland to go through 6 years of austerity without trouble? Will Mr Gierk's pragmatism be enough to restore the economic and social balances which are now so seriously upset? Nothing is less sure because Poland, young, modernized, facing toward the West, would suffocate if the corset were too tight: "It is true," said a leadership spokesman, "that our political and economic structures are not best suited to our level of development but it would be far too risky to undertake any broad reforms in a situation as difficult as this one. After the congress, we will try some experiments but we will learn our lessons from them and if it is feasible at the next congress, then we will decide on major changes. For the immediate future, there will be no sudden changes." After a moment deep in thought, he added: "You see, it is better not to gain than to lose."

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CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

AFGHAN TRADE UNIONS--Warsaw, 14 Mar, PAP--TRYBUNA LUDU's special correspondent in Kabul, Jerzy Lobman, met chairman of Afghan trade unions, Azim Szachbol to discuss living and working standards of Afghan workers. Below are excerpts from Lobman's correspondence published in today's issue of TRYBUNA LUDU.

"All in all trade unions affiliate 160,000 people (circa one per cent of the entire Afghan population), including 80,000 inhabitants of Kabul. Women account for 2-3 per cent of Afghan unionists though the percentage of women employees is much higher." "At present the trade unions organization is being reconstructed. This year the Afghan trade unions are going to convene a nation-wide congress of trade unions. The congress will elect new authorities to replace the now-acting preparatory committee." The Afghan trade unions deal today with problems of safety and hygiene at work, conflicts with manufacturers and education. They run free-of-charge courses of reading and writing since most workers are illiterate and take care of social insurance."

"The basis of workers' legislature has already been founded in Afghanistan. A principle was adopted that employees of private factories have a right to benefit from all the accomplishments that workers of state plants do. A worker cannot be sacked who has not broken regulations. Afghan women have a right to a three-month maternity leave." "Workers' average wages reach some 32.50 U.S. dollars whereas those white-color workers oscillate from 42 to 68 dollars. A young worker starting work, for instance, at the Bagrami factory in Kabul earns some 16 dollars. Moreover, every worker has a right to receive coupons to buy staples at lower prices in workers' cooperatives. [Text] [LD142336 Warsaw PAP in English 1710 GMT 14 Mar 80 LD]

AFGHAN GOVERNMENT SEEKING SUPPORT--Kabul, 15 Mar (PAP)--Three weeks after the antigovernment events in Kabul the revolutionary authorities have stepped up their struggle to gain the support of the society, the tribal elders and the mullahs, who exert an influence on a large part of the population. At the moment, leading members of the Afghan leadership are visiting various areas of the country and meeting with representatives of the Afghan tribes and the Moslem clergy. The Afghan leaders are explaining that the new government is ready to mend the excesses made by the Hafizollah Amin, overthrown last December, and that the limited unit of the Soviet armed forces will leave Afghanistan as soon as outside forces stop helping counterrevolution forces and leave Afghanistan alone. Agitators of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan appear at street meetings in Kabul's bazaar districts to fend off counterrevolutionary propaganda, which managed to convince a number of tradesmen to close their shops for a few days during the February events.

The to-date results of the investigation of the February 21 and 22 events show that they were organized jointly by a number of counterrevolutionary groups, with headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. The groups include "the Islamic Revolution Movement" and the "Islamic Party," partnered by the Maoist "United Afghanistan Liberation Organization (SAMA)." In order to cause unrest in Afghanistan, these organizations used their units from Jalalabad, other provincial towns and from the mountains. [Text]
[LD151838 Warsaw PAP in English 1509 GMT 15 Mar 80 LD]

FRENCH ENVOY PRESENTS CREDENTIALS--Today, Henryk Jablonski, chairman of the Council of State, received in an audience at the Belweder Palace Jaques Depuy, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of France, who presented his credentials. [Text] [LD180106 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2100 GMT 17 Mar 80 LD]

DSU: 2600

PATRASCANU'S VIEWS ON CAPITALISM IN PRE-WAR PERIOD DISCUSSED

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 3, 5 Feb 80 pp 31-34; No 4, 20 Feb 80 pp 39-42

[Article by Dr Vasile Iota: "L. D. Patrascanu's View on the State of the Development of Capitalism in Romania in the Pre-War Period"]

[Text] A central concern of Lucretiu Patrascanu's historical and social-economic studies was the most correct definition of the nature, structure, state and perspectives for the economic and social development of Romania in the pre-war period. The problem had special theoretical and practical importance since the elaboration of our communist party's tactics and strategy and its revolutionary struggle was depending upon this definition.

As is known, the Fifth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party made some clarifications in these problems, justly defining Romania as a capitalist country with a backward economy and with significant feudal practices in agriculture, and correctly mentioned in the main that the revolutionary forces were at the head of achieving the bourgeois-democratic revolution and that the pre-dominant role in this transformation would be played by the working class. In his different studies, Lucretiu Patrascanu brings forth numerous facts and data and new arguments through which he broadly demonstrates the basic correctness of these evaluations and adapts or corrects, according to the new circumstances generated by the opening of World War II, certain outdated or erroneous these in different party documents.

It is also known that in different party documents, especially in documents from the Third, Fourth and Fifth Congresses, which did contain a series of just ideas and theses, in various forms there was mention of the false theory of "Romania - an imperialist country," elaborated by the Comintern and imposed from outside upon some of our party's documents.

This incorrect evaluation was for the first time put forth in a resolution of the Sixth Conference of the Balkan Communist Federation, an organ of the Communist International, held in Berlin in December 1923. At its basis were biased statistical data regarding the percentages of different nationalities in Romania's population after World War I, as well as a series of theses that had nothing in common with social-political and historical reality. Some of these theses stated that the Moldavians were not Romanians, that the reunification of certain ancient Romanian territories with the majority Romanian population into a single state was not a lawful process of creating and completing the formation of the unified Romanian national state, but a "conquest" or "imperialist annexation" of foreign territories, and that post-1918 Romania was an artificial creation of the peace treaties of Versailles, Trianon and Neuilly. This is the source of the evaluation that Romania was not a unified national state, but rather a "multinational" state, and the task laid out by the Comintern to militate for the self-determination of the other nationalities, including the division of the Romanian state.

"The erroneous theses and slogans encountered in the party documents from this period," comrade Nicolae Ceausescu noted, "occurred because of a lack of in-depth analysis of the history of the Romanian people and the economic-social development and relationship of forces in our country, as well as the mechanical mastery of certain theses elaborated abroad as a result of the practices of the Comintern. It was the Comintern that established directives that did not take into account the specific realities in our country and gave tactical guidance and directives that did not correspond to the economic, social-political and national conditions in Romania."¹

Also sensing the shortcomings of certain Marxist research regarding the history of the Romanian people, economic-social development and the relationship of forces, and being convinced of the erroneous nature of certain theses and slogans in different party documents, L. D. Patrascanu dedicated a great part of his studies precisely to these problems. In this context, we encounter the concern for the definition of the state of the development of capitalism in Romania and a series of positions regarding the thesis of "Romania - an imperialist country."

I have presented the content and the "arguments" of this false thesis so that, by comparison, we can decipher more exactly the true position and views of L. D. Patrascanu. I say the true position because in his works we encounter both passages and evaluations

from which we could deduce his adherence to this thesis and passages, and especially the deep spirit of his writings, through which he clearly separates himself from it. In our opinion, Patrascanu did not split this thesis, but his apparent position and intentional contradiction were the only means possible under the given conditions to disassociate himself from this thesis, to vex the Romanian reader and to get him to judge for himself, offering the reader certain arguments, and to form on his own a just opinion. As a scientist and communist, Patrascanu could not give his endorsement to the authorities and his prestige to a profoundly incorrect thesis. This is the source, in his apparent position and intentional contradiction, of the difficulty of deciphering and evaluating his true position.

The following is a necessary basic observation: in the Comintern view the term imperialism is used not in the Leninist sense of a new stage of capitalism, but in the Kautskyst sense of "annexation" of certain foreign territories. At the same time, even the Kautskyst definition, severely criticized in its time by Lenin, was used in a subverted form since Kautsky defined imperialism as "the tendency of each capitalist industrialist nation to annex or subordinate 'agrarian' regions..."² And, it was a well known fact, stressed numerous times in the pre-war party documents, that Romania both before and after World War I was a backward agrarian country and that, for example, Transylvania and the Banat were more developed from an industrial point of view than pre-war Romania. With very few exceptions, Lucretiu Patrascanu, who made those exceptions in reference not to the events in 1918, but to those after 1940 and to which we will later refer, did not discuss Romanian imperialism in the Comintern meaning, but tried to discover certain features of imperialism in the Leninist definition, of a new state of capitalism, thus avoiding the content of ideas in the Comintern thesis. His conclusion was that Romania could not be considered a so-called imperialist country, neither in the Leninist nor the Comintern definition.

We will return to this problem more broadly later.

A second observation: While the resolution of the Third Party Congress, held in Vienna in August 1924, stated unequivocally that Romania "had become a country of nationalities from a national state," L. D. Patrascanu, in his doctoral thesis written during the same period, merely formulated a question that he left unanswered: "Romania, as a result of the peace treaty, ceased to exist as a national state?"³ If he had shared the Comintern thesis, without a doubt the answer would have been affirmative.

In support of this interpretation there is a second significant moment: Demonstrating within the framework of this same congress the erroneous content of the thesis regarding the multinational nature of the Romanian state, which later was to be introduced (and was in fact introduced) in the congress' resolution, L. D. Patrascanu pointed out that the Moldavians did not represent a separate nation and that from an historical and geographic point of view they are Romanians. "In this way," Patrascanu said, "I feel that the introduction of this type of false point also makes the resolution false."

A third observation: While in the different party documents there was a call for communists to struggle "for the right of self-determination for all the oppressed nations, up to the dissolution of the Romanian state," and there was a feeling that "together with the fundamental social contradictions, the national contradictions between the oppressed peoples and the ruling classes of the Romanian nation have an enormous importance for the nature, tasks and motive forces of the revolution in Romania,"⁴ L. D. Patrascanu, in defining the nature, tasks and motive forces for achieving the bourgeois-democratic revolution, gave these contradictions a totally secondary importance. He did not tie the solution of the agrarian problem to the solution of the nationality problem and he did not consider the agrarian problem as a component of the nationality problem and vice versa. At the same time, the call for self-determination was formulated completely differently: "In the nationality policy..., the workers are for an immediate end to any type of measure, be it legislative or administrative, that is directed against the coinhabitating nationalities... Only through the free consent of the majority of the population of a province can their belonging to the Romanian state be considered legitimate." Over several pages he more clearly expresses his position: "The nationality policy followed by the working class in Romania does not lean towards the breaking up of the country's territory and its division into provinces that are apparently or actually autonomous."⁵

In light of this position, in Patrascanu's works, although he sometimes uses the line according to which the post-World War I Romania was the product of that war or the great powers of Europe presided over the creation of Greater Romania, we do not encounter a criticism of these peace treaties, which suggests his views regarding the legitimacy of the borders of Romania as established by those treaties.

In our opinion, just these few observations are sufficient to demonstrate that Lucretiu Patrascanu did not share the thesis of "Romania - an imperialist country" in the Comintern definition. The problem, however, is more complex and we suggest looking at it further.

First of all, it is necessary for us to clarify Patrascanu's position regarding this thesis in the Leninist view because its acceptance, even in this definition, does not exclude, but rather presupposes expansionist and annexationist tendencies. Then, it is necessary to further decipher Patrascanu's position regarding the causes of Romania's participation in World War II.

In different passages in his work, "The Basic Problems of Romania" and in "Under Three Dictatorships," the statement is made that the development of capitalism in Romania after 1918 "no longer takes place within the framework of free competition, but in the mode of monopolistic capitalism." Similarly, the statement is made according to which "monopolistic capitalism, controlling the domestic market, subordinated its agricultural sector," that "the positions occupied by this capitalism, especially in the last decade, are more and more powerful," that "the Romanian economy is to a great degree ruled by monopolistic capitalism," and that "monopolistic capitalism holds the key positions in the national economy" and so forth. These are statements that can lead to the conclusion that one of the fundamental traits of imperialism, the domination of monopolies, existed in Romania.

Another group of arguments refers to the second trait of imperialism in the Leninist definition, and that is the domination of financial capital. Patrascanu stated that even before 1914 one could speak of the existence of financial capital, that "only in the last quarter of the century, that is, after 1918, did financial capital also extend its sphere of influence into Romania and become one of the determining factors in the development of our economy," and that "financial capital in its classical form occupied a dominant position both in the industrial economy and in the country's entire economy."

On the basis of the above statements, supplemented with the idea that after 1932 the protectionist policy changed its content, acquiring a "monopolistic nature," and that because of the ever more massive intervention of the state in the economy, especially after the creation of the royal dictatorship, in favor of heavy industry, metallurgy and siderurgy, there was an ever more complete

subordination of the state apparatus to the interests of the great monopolies, as well as on the basis of certain vague references to the appearance of a "plethora of liquid capital" on the eve of World War II that raised the problem of exporting capital (the third trait of monopolistic capitalism according to Lenin's definition), accompanied by the appearance of an "industrial overproduction" which made necessary "the extension of the domestic market through the conquest of territories," Lucretiu Patrascanu formulated a synthetic evaluation: "The evolution of the Romanian economy falls in the stage during which entire capitalist system spread throughout the world: its imperialist stage... If we cannot speak of an identity between the Romanian economy, considered in its entirety, and the economy of the imperialist countries proper, the industrial economy, in its main sectors, categorically moved along the lines and within the framework of capitalist production relations, having all the forms of capitalism proper" (p 64). In another passage he states that "over the last decades in the industrial economy in Romania, we encounter all the phenomena that characterize the current stage attained by capitalism in the West, the monopolistic stage" (p 30). At the end of his work he makes a similar synthetic statement: "Although the evolution of events in Romania presents an entire series of its own traits, generally they fall within the evolution of the European capitalist system, which also is in its final stage, the imperialist stage" (p 282).

In light of the above, as well as other passages, one could draw the conclusion of Patrascanu's adherence to the theses of "Romania - an imperialist country" in the Leninist sense of the concept of imperialism. Let us, however, more carefully analyze these passages and their arguments, as well as some ideas and facts also presented by Patrascanu which not only place a question mark on such a conclusion, but represent an explicit or implicit rejection of this thesis.

A basic finding is that all these passages refer to the period after 1918 and especially after 1932, which tends to show his opinion that Romania did not participate in World War I as an imperialist country and that there were no domestic forces of an imperialist nature in 1918 for the "annexation" of certain foreign territories. The above statements reflect, with the appropriate reservations, the real fact that after 1918, and especially after the 1929-1933 crisis which accentuated the concentration and centralization of capital, some monopolies appeared which occupied "more and more powerful" positions, controlling to "a large degree" the Romanian economy, and that

only after 1918 did financial capital "extend its" sphere of influence and "become one of the determining factors in the Romanian economy."

Secondly, Patrascanu's terminology must be understood exactly and what he understood by the statement according to which the economy of Romania "falls within" or moves "within the framework" of the imperialist stage of capitalism. For an exact understanding of these expressions, as well as the sense of those made in the two above-quoted synthetic passages, it is useful, in our opinion, to compare them with two other similar passages, but ones referring to another historical period. For example, in "One Century of Social Unrest," written during the same period as his other two principal works (1941-1943), in referring to the period at the end of the 18th century when, in his opinion, the Romanian countries were under a feudal system, not a capitalist one, Patrascanu wrote: "The appearance of salaried work during a feudal period proves the direction taken by the relationships of production. And, if one still cannot speak of enterprises of a capitalist nature, they did, however, lean towards this form of organization. From this point of view, the evolution of the Principalities falls within the general evolution of the economies of the other European countries."

Over several pages, he makes a similar statement for the period between 1821 and 1829: "The evolution of the Romanian countries, alongside that of Moldavia, falls within the general capitalist development in Europe."⁶

From the passages quoted above, the more significant ones, moreover, it shows that in Patrascanu's view interwar Romania was not in the imperialist phase, still did not have a monopolist type economy, but merely was evolving in the direction of the imperialist stage and was at the beginning of a new phase of capitalism, which is perfectly true. In support of this interpretation, there is also the more careful analysis of the two synthetic passages. This shows that it involved not the Romanian economy in its totality, but only its industrial economy, and here only "in its main sectors," which moved within the framework of the capitalist production relations, also exhibiting specific forms of imperialism. These even-keeled and restricted formulations must be correlated, on one hand, with the Leninist view, as shared by Patrascanu and according to which the transition to imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism was determined above all by a powerful development of the forces of production, especially industry, and on the other hand correlated with the backward and predominantly agrarian nature of the Romanian

interwar economy, as frequently emphasized by Patrascanu. Therefore, if in a predominantly agrarian economy only a part of the industrial economy also contained some specific forms of imperialism, with these also being inferior, incipient forms, it is clear that the overall Romanian economy cannot be evaluated as a monopolistic type economy. This is precisely the sense of emphasizing the specific "traits" of the Romanian economy compared to the "European capitalist system" and "the economy of the imperialist countries proper," with the Romanian economy not being considered by Patrascanu as an imperialist economy proper.

This same line is taken again in "Under Three Dictatorships." Analyzing the differences between the political systems in Germany-Italy and the Balkan countries, including Romania, Patrascanu stressed the backward and agrarian nature of the economies of the Balkan countries, which "represented, in comparison with all the advanced capitalist countries and even within the framework of world capitalism, a backward stage and a structure different from theirs."⁷ The specific manner of arguing for the domination of the monopolies also leads to this same conclusion. When the domination of the monopolies is evoked, it refers exclusively to the existence of certain incipient, inferior and unstable forms of monopolies, such as cartels and unions which, as is known, represent understandings between different enterprises regarding conditions of supply and sales, in other words, the trade sector. This demonstrates that in Patrascanu's view even the creation of monopolies was in an incipient stage.

On the other hand, the specific data quoted to "demonstrate" the power and extent of the actions of these monopolies actually show their weaknesses. For example, he points out that in 1938, at the end of the interwar period, of a total of 3,767 enterprises in the heavy transformer industry, nearly 1,600 (42 percent) were part of 94 cartels which accounted for 46 percent of the total capital and 23 percent of the total production from these enterprises. Detailing it by branch, he points out that in the metallurgical industry the cartels held 90 percent of the capital and controlled 42 percent of the production. "In the entire principal industries of the country - metallurgy, chemicals, food stuffs and so forth - the capital in the cartels represented 61 percent, controlling 34 percent of production" (p 43). The double amount of capital held in comparison to the amount of industrial production furnished demonstrates that we are talking especially about involving in cartels certain small and medium-sized enterprises for the purpose of protecting them against competition from big enterprises or foreign goods.

Similarly, there is also significance in a quote reproduced by Patrascanu to illustrate the rapid process of creating cartels in the big industries in Romania: "Cartel fever involved so many of our industrialists that even the manufacturers of soda water, lemonade, bricks and tiles, lamps, horseshoes and so forth joined together among themselves" (p 42).

The statement that the majority of the large industrial enterprises were new creations, having appeared between the two world wars, that the majority of them were stock companies and that in addition to this concentration there was an intense process of centralization through absorption and merger, although textually they are treated as "specific forms of the monopolistic stage of capitalism," in no way changes the above interpretation, since Patrascanu himself quotes in context the definitions given by Marx for concentrating and centralizing, thus suggesting that these forms are also correct for premonopolistic capitalism. Even Marx emphasized the great advantages of stock companies and the dependency of the size of enterprise not only upon the amount of individual or collective capital, but also upon the level of development of the forces of production. And so, the invocation of the use of a protectionist policy that frequently led to prohibitions, as well as the intervention of the state in the economy, are not related solely to the imperialist stage and Patrascanu frequently stressed that in Romania such a policy was practiced even in the second half of the 19th century.

L. D. Patrascanu's position can be even more clearly deduced on the basis of "The Course of Political Economy," presented in 1946 at the Law Department in Bucharest. Addressing again the problem of defining the capitalist nature of the interwar Romanian economy exactly in the manner in "The Basic Problems..." and no longer making any reference or allusion to the imperialist stage or even to the existence or domination of monopolies or financial capital, he stated that "the capitalist element predominated in the sector of industrial economy." But, he immediately adds: "The question is asked however: What is the capitalist power of Romania? Romania's entire historical development in reality lead to a scarcity of capital. Despite the predomination of the capitalist element, we find a weakness of the so-called capitalist element even in the sector of the purely capitalist economy and even in the sector of industrial economy. In other words, I want to stress," noted Patrascanu, "that the industrial economy, the capitalist sector of the Romanian economy was born under difficult historical conditions which brought about this weakness in the so-called capitalist power" (p 106, MS).

It should be stressed that such statements are not the only ones. In "Under Three Dictatorships," referring to the Balkan countries, including Romania, he stated that "the national bourgeoisie are relatively weak. The Balkan countries are all recent creations... As late entries into the orbit of capitalism, they have preserved and still preserve powerful remnants of feudalism. When the bourgeoisie came to power here, it was forced to share it right from the beginning with the representatives of the large landowners, just as it was forced to share its profits with foreign capital, which everywhere in the Balkans took the lion's share of the profits (cornering petroleum and wood in Romania...). Not having sufficient capital and encountering great difficulties in precapitalist investments because of their agrarian nature and the historical conditions in which they developed, the national bourgeoisie were incapable of exploiting these things themselves even on the reduced domestic markets."⁸

Also to illustrate "the capitalist weaknesses" of interwar Romania and to illustrate the losses it suffered in its trade with other more developed countries, there is significance in some of the data presented in the already-mentioned speech presented in 1933 within the framework of a Comintern session. "If in 1914, it was necessary to export three kilograms of domestically produced goods to obtain one kilogram of imported goods, in 1930 for each kilogram of imported goods Romania exported 16 kilograms and, in 1932, 21 kilograms of its own production."⁹ On the basis of all these facts and data, as well as others not mentioned here, Patrascanu formulated with good reason the conclusion, in total contradiction to the theme of "Romania - an imperialist country," that "our industrial economy appears as a product of certain conditions specific to our country, which has had a primitive, weak capitalist investment resulting from certain specific historical conditions and which makes the power of capitalism in Romania appear in a light other than that in the other European countries" (P 110 - MS).

The careful analysis of Patrascanu's views regarding "financial capital" and its domination as a proper trait of Romanian imperialism leads roughly to the same conclusion. First of all, we must note Patrascanu's express statement that he uses the term financial capital in the definition given to this notion by Hilferding, that is, in the sense of "capital at the disposal of the banks and made available to industry" ("The Basic Problems of Romania," p 54. The footnotes in the text refer to this work). As is known, Lenin regarded this definition, and rightly so, as "incomplete, since it does not indicate one of the most important moments: the growth of the concentration of production to such a great degree that the

the concentration generates, and has generated, monopolies."¹⁰ Patrascanu nonetheless uses Hilferding's definition, not because he did not know Lenin's or because he wanted to disassociate himself from it, but for the simple fact that the definition given by Lenin, although generally valid, did not find a reflection in Romanian reality. Actually, Patrascanu found as a wide-spread phenomenon a certain participation by the banks in our country in the financing of certain industries, but not a merger of monopolistic banking capital with industrial monopolistic capital. As a not at all negligible detail, we find that in the evaluation of "financial capital" Patrascanu includes not only the shares of certain banks in industry or long-term bank credits, but also commercial credit, a very significant factor, but characteristic of the activities and role of banks in premonopolistic capitalism.

Even more significant is the fact that in the context of treating the problems regarding industrial, banking or financial capital, Patrascanu also insistently stressed numerous times the dominant position of foreign capital in our country, both in industry and in banking. Speaking of the beginning of the formation of financial capital, even back in 1914, Patrascanu wanted to stress that "in the period prior to World War I within the framework of the economy of lesser Romania, 80 percent of the capital invested in industry was foreign capital, while for banking enterprises the figure was 55 percent. In some industries, foreign capital accounted for over 90 percent of the total capital (petroleum, electrotechny, sugar and so forth), while some banks worked nearly exclusively with foreign capital" (p 189). After World War I, although the percentage of domestic capital experienced a certain growth (as a result of the withdrawal of certain massive amounts of foreign capital during the 1929-1933 crisis), foreign capital still held, in Patrascanu's opinion, important positions. For example, it had over 70 percent in the petroleum industry and between 25 and 60 percent in numerous other industries, as well as in banking. Regarding the petroleum industry, one of the more important industries during the interwar period, he stated that it "was to a large degree incorporated as part of world trusts and was directly dependent upon London, New York, Paris or Amsterdam" ("Under Three Dictatorships," p 17). The coming of the danger of World War II, according to the opinion and data cited by Patrascanu, led not just to the weakening of the position of foreign capital, but to the gradual replacement of French, English, Dutch and others' capital with German capital. Patrascanu quotes data which shows that in 1941 of the total capital invested in the Romanian economy 53 percent was foreign capital and that during the 1938 to 1942 period the volume of German capital invested in Romania grew 14 times over. This figure is even more

significant since it refers to Romania in 1942 when it was smaller than in 1938. All of the above shows that the so-called "domination" of financial capital actually meant, in Patrascanu's view, the domination of foreign capital and the subordination to a large degree of the Romanian economy to the interests of the great monopolies in the developed capitalist countries. It should be noted that Patrascanu is not talking about "the formation" of financial capital as a result of concentrating and centralizing industrial and banking capital, but the fact that after 1918 "financial capital also extended its sphere of influence into Romania," which suggests, similarly, the domination of foreign capital.

The references to the existence of a certain "plethora of liquid capital" in the years prior to World War II which did not find its way into investments in the Romanian economy and which could suggest the idea for a need to export capital and to annex certain territories in order to find a place for investments, are accompanied in context by the statement that this "unemployed capital," as Patrascanu calls it, appeared as a temporary phenomenon as a result of economic and political instability and insecurity caused by the impending opening of World War II. On the basis of analyses of capitalist investments and shortages of assets in Romania, Patrascanu pointed out that in Romania there was no relative surplus of capital which Lenin said formed export capital. He felt that the invasion of foreign capital was brought about, among other things, by the scarcity of domestic capital and by the very large industrial and bank profits in comparison to the profits in the developed capitalist countries (see "Banks and Their Profits," in the volume "Social-Political Texts, 1921-1938," the Politica Publishing House, 1975, pp 103-155). The large volume and percentage of foreign capital in Romania were, in his view, not only proof of the shortage of domestic capital, but also the cause, as has already been mentioned, of weak domestic investments and the impoverishment of the country because of the outflow of profits and an important part of the national income created by the labor of the Romanian people to foreign countries.

One of the arguments of an economic nature that could "demonstrate" the existence of certain imperialist tendencies, this time in an annexationist or expansionist sense, is the one referring to the appearance of "industrial overproduction," to the shrinking of the domestic market and, therefore, to the need to conquer certain foreign markets. Patrascanu states at one point that the annexationist plans followed in World War II were not the fruit of an ad-hoc enthusiasm or an imperialist expansion. "Without a doubt," he wrote, "imperialist tendencies for a century have been in Romania, with its economic and social

structure, with profound weaknesses in its entire organism and with a still low economic level would appear more as a joke or, in the best case, the product of a sick imagination. Nonetheless, such tendencies were of an older time... Some of the grounds necessary for an annexationist policy for Romania were publically present long before the beginning of the war" (pp 11, 12).

In order to illustrate this idea, he refers to a statement made back in 1925 by Vintila Bratianu who said merely that soon the Romanian industry would satisfy its domestic needs and would raise the question of exporting its surplus industrial products. Since the bourgeoisie and the ruling classes rejected the idea of expanding the domestic market by adopting certain measures that would increase the buying power of the population, such as a new agrarian reform, increasing wages, decreasing prices and so forth, and since Romanian products had no chance of competing on the foreign markets, Patrascanu stated that the great bourgeoisie felt that the efficient solution was a policy of territorial conquest. "The great domestic monopolistic capital needed to expand the domestic market by extending the national territory." According to Patrascanu's statement, this was precisely "the real, hidden basis for these imperialist tendencies" (pp 12, 14).

It would appear that here we have a clear explanation of the bases for Romania's "imperialist tendencies," as well as the "real, hidden" basis for these tendencies.

In our opinion, however, this "argument" by Patrascanu is also intentionally contradictory and unconvincing since, alongside the precise statement that the domestic market had become too narrow, he broadly develops the idea that Romanian industry and the Romanian bourgeoisie were incapable of satisfying or "conquering" even this narrow market. For example, in referring to the situation prior to World War I, L. D. Patrascanu pointed out that the Romanian bourgeoisie was opposed to the more radical solution of the agrarian problem for the reason, among others, that it would have generated a rapid broadening of the domestic market, which would only have served foreign capital. "The domestic, limited, narrow market... was nonetheless still too broad for the possibilities of the domestic industrial capital... Prior to 1914, the country's industrial production barely satisfied a small part of the requirements of the domestic market. And, the active foreign capital inside the country, still at a massive level, contributed to this. But, not just that in such a case (the carrying out of a radical agrarian reform and, as a consequence, the rapid broadening of the domestic market - V.I.) would this domestic capital have gained nothing from the transformations that would have occurred, but it would have had very much to lose since

to the same degree in which the domestic market expanded, it would have proved powerless to cover and satisfy it and foreign capital, through the export of goods and capital, would have acquired new positions in the country's economy, creating an even greater disproportion between its power and domestic power."¹¹

This theme is taken up again to explain the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the landowners in carrying out the agrarian reforms in 1918 to 1921, as well as to explain the interwar bourgeoisie's opposition to a new agrarian reform. The Romanian bourgeoisie, wrote Patrascanu, "needed to extend the domestic market right after the war that had increased the country's industrial and financial potential." But, the bourgeoisie... represented a relatively weak economic force and it needed only a limited expansion of the market. That is, a market that it could control and exploit through its own means. An expansion beyond the limits of its own power would have favored the foreign capital, whose competition so worried the exponents of Romanian bourgeoisie. This is the source of the lack of interest of this bourgeoisie in a radical agrarian reform - radical in the sense of eliminating large land holdings" (pp 83-84). In the end of his work, he insisted once again: "Although directly interested in the development of capitalism and its forms of production, and nonetheless not having the means necessary to exploit a broad domestic market created out of the dissolution of the large land holdings and the elimination of serfdom, it (the bourgeoisie - V.I.) was not directly interested in its creation... A radical and total agrarian reform that would have dissolved the large land holdings and provided the opportunity for the general economic improvement of the peasantry, would have at the same time expanded the domestic market. But, despite the relative strengthening of the Romanian bourgeoisie after and as a result of World War I, not it, but foreign capital was the one to greatly benefit" (p 280).

This fully acceptable opinion brings forth yet another powerful argument against the thesis that right from World War I Romania participated as an imperialist country with annexationist tendencies.

The situation after World War I changed somewhat in the sense that the domestic market expanded, but, as Patrascanu states, especially in favor of foreign goods and capital. Shortly after 1932, as a result of the accentuation of protectionism, a response to the autarchical policies of the industrialized countries towards the products of the agrarian countries, the Romanian bourgeoisie attempted and in part succeeded to control more significant positions in the domestic market. "The rise of absolute rule in the countries in Central Europe," wrote L. D. Patrascanu, "the hard currency restrictions and the spread of the prohibitionist tariff system opened all at once

vast perspectives for the bourgeoisie... The Romanian bourgeoisie could progress with a great chance of success in eliminating, or at least substantially limiting, the competition of foreign industrial capital on the domestic market and ensure their dominant position behind the security of a powerful customs wall..." Stressing this idea, he states that once again shortly after 1932 "the attempts of the Romanian bourgeoisie to control the domestic market had begun to yield the awaited fruits... The control of the domestic market through its own means and in competition with similar foreign products was from the very beginning a lost cause without a permanent and powerful tariff protection system, in some cases taking on a prohibitive nature."¹²

The above once again shows the weakness of the Romanian bourgeoisie and the fact that shortly after 1932 it could progress towards controlling the domestic market, that its struggle in this direction had barely begun to yield the awaited results and that the Romanian bourgeoisie felt that "the moment of its expansion had arrived," and it also shows Patrascanu's view that the Romanian bourgeoisie's expansionism foresaw controlling the domestic market. It also clearly shows that the big problem was not just the "narrowness" of the domestic market as much as the fact that this market, narrow or broad, was flooded with foreign goods and capital.

On the basis of the information up until now in Patrascanu's works, we believe the conclusion can be drawn that the complete analysis of the "capitalist power of Romania," of the "power" and importance of monopolies and "financial capital," of the domination of foreign capital and goods on the Romanian market, of the level of economic development in general and industry and agriculture specifically, and of the replacement of the domination of Anglo-French capital with German capital, to which one can also add the territorial losses in 1940, leads to the conclusion that in Patrascanu's view Romania was not and could not be an imperialist country, that Romanian or the monopolies in Romania could not objectively participate in the struggle to divide and redive the world economically or territorially, and that Romania itself was the object and the victim of the struggle between the great powers and monopolies that aspired to new economic and territorial conquests.

This analysis leads the conclusion, directly suggested by Patrascanu even if textually it could sometimes be interpreted otherwise, that to speak of the imperialist tendencies of a country like Romania, with its economic and social structure, with the profound weaknesses of its entire system and with the low level of its economy, is (not "appears" as I. D. Patrascanu mentions) more a joke or, in the best case, the product of a sick imagination. In our opinion, this "appears" in Patrascanu's text actually represents a retreat before

the eventual criticisms for his frontal attack against a thesis that figured in the party documents imposed from without and which did not reflect the true position of the Romanian Communist Party, a party which, in fact, worked for the fundamental national interests of the Romanian people.

Patrascanu stated, and rightly so, that an "imperialist-annexationist" propaganda actually existed in Romania, especially after the territorial transfers in 1940. He emphasizes, however, that such propaganda, until the beginning of the war, was run nearly exclusively in the legionnaire press and, after the war had begun, in the official Antonescu press. Correctly evaluating that only the Iron Guard "represented the fascist type party from an ideological, programmatic and structural-organizational point of view" (p 49), Patrascanu rightly stated that the Iron Guard was an agency of Hitlerist Germany in Romania.

Speaking, for example, of the "enfetterment of the Iron Guard to the German Hitlerist movement," Patrascanu stated: "The Iron Guard movement has openly only in recent years played the role of a national-socialist agency in Romania. The activities of the Iron Guard to achieve an alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis reflected to a large degree, therefore, a subordination of a nature other than merely political" (p 72). It is true, he wrote, that for a good period of time when the Iron Guard, through its demagogy and its foreign pro-Hitlerist orientation, did not represent a real danger for the existing social system and Romania's defensive alliances, the Guard was supported and encouraged by different political groups of the bourgeoisie, as well as by different governments, including King Carol, but only for its domestic anti-democratic and anti-worker activities. "The Iron Guard movement," wrote Patrascanu, "was at the beginning and later for years created and supported by all the right wing Romanian governments in order to serve as a reactionary instrument for the interests of big capital and the big landowners against the workers, the peasantry and bourgeois democracy."¹³ Thus, from this point of view, the Iron Guard movement fulfilled a role similar to German Nazism and Italian fascism.

At the same time, however, Patrascanu stresses, in different ways and numerous times, that the principal groups of the Romanian bourgeoisie dissociated themselves from the Guard when it was a question of the Guard's orientation in foreign affairs, which were plainly pro-German and pro-Hitlerist. The basic motives were, on one hand, Germany's threat to Romania's territorial integrity and borders and, on the other hand, the grave danger of economic subordination and the transformation of the Romanian economy into an annex or even a

a colony of Germany. This is the source of the hostile attitude of the greater part of the Romanian bourgeoisie towards political and economic closeness to Germany.

In its foreign policy, Patrascanu wrote, even in 1938 the Iron Guard wanted Romania's immediate entrance into the Rome-Berlin Axis, which, in the view of a large part of the Romanian bourgeoisie, would have meant "a threat itself to the existence of the country."

"The ties between the leaders of the Third Reich and the Iron Guard movement were well known," wrote L. D. Patrascanu. Abroad, the Iron Guard was considered, and correctly so, a simple Hitlerist agency in Romania... Could the Romanian bourgeoisie have at that moment a policy alongside Germany? Just as France and England were at the head of those countries that defended the status quo created at Versailles and Trianon, which also implicitly defended the borders of Greater Romania, the Romanian bourgeoisie... just could not abandon those countries that had raised the flag of revisionism and that defended at all times and at Romania's expense the territorial claims of Hungary or Bulgaria" (pp 142-143). The coming of the Iron Guards to power would have meant an alliance with Germany and support for the revisionist policies.

Now, from the above we should also remember, among other things, the idea that it was not Romania that had territorial pretensions and, therefore, that the territorial integrity of other countries was threatened, but, on the contrary, it was exposed to the danger of certain territorial divisions, a danger, as history proved, that was very real. Under these conditions, "could Romania," Patrascanu asked, "an agrarian country that had satisfied all its territorial claims through peace treaties and that already included a foreign population of nearly five million people be an imperialist country?" From all the analysis we get Patrascanu's negative answer to this question and the suggestive response that "the Iron Guard nonetheless proclaimed the need for an imperialist Romanian policy" (p 37).

The coming of the Iron Guard to power after 6 September 1941 and later Romania's involvement in the anti-Soviet war were the "result of direct pressures and schemes of a Hitlerist nature. This government was imposed from without and not created organically from within" (p 210) and it came to power "under the protection of German bayonets" (p 258). In his opinion, as confirmed by history, Hitler and Mussolini were the "two foreign patrons" of the Iron Guard and the "Iron Guard movement worked on the orders of Hitlerist Berlin while the death squads were merely the pawns

thrown into the struggle that Hitler had begun... in order to subjugate Romania" (p 196). "The military collapse of France and with retreat of the English army from the continent in the summer of 1940 destroyed the system of alliances and guarantees that had tied Romania to the anti-revisionist countries in the West" (p 185).

Patrascanu stressed the fact that "a part of the bourgeoisie was in opposition as long as it could to the Guardist foreign policies" and "alliances" and, in fact, against the occupation of the country by the German troops, but there can be no talk of a "formal opposition or a change in Romania's foreign orientation in the European situation created by the war. Only in this way can it be explained why, after the elimination of the Iron Guard government, the government of the generals... continued this orientation imposed upon the Romanian people after 6 September 1940" (pp 244-245).

This statement, as well as others, permits the deciphering of the true sense of the first sentences in "The Basic Problems of Romania," in which there is talk of the improvement of the German-Romanian alliance by Antonescu's military-fascist dictatorship. It suggests that this was not an alliance in the proper sense of the word, but that it was imposed upon the Romanian people.

During the five months that it governed, the Iron Guard movement fulfilled the mission it had received from its foreign partners. "Bringing the German armies into the country, actually subordinating all Romanian political power to the Hitlerist occupationists and making available to the Reich all the natural wealth and raw materials of the country (petroleum, grain, wood), the communications system, the entire state apparatus and so forth, fully illustrate the work accomplished in this area during the Iron Guard government" (p 204).

Speaking about the annexationist tendencies of the Iron Guard movement, L. D. Patrascanu mentions: "Hitler's and Mussolini's intentions of satisfying the demands of Hungary regarding Transylvania were well known... In the face of these perspectives, which were not unreal, as the Dictate of Vienna proved in August 1940, the leadership of the Iron Guard wanted to create the necessary equivalent to the losses in the West by increasing and expanding Romania's territory in the East, beyond the Dneestr" (pp 59, 60).

In his different writings, Patrascanu points out broadly the firm opposition of the Romanian people, and first of all the working class, to the country's occupation by Hitlerist troops and to the dragging of Romania into the war, showing the profound hostility of the popular masses both to the domestic regime and its foreign policy. As the war evolved, this opposition continued to grow.

The popular, general desire was, instead of territorial conquests in the East, to work for the reacquisition of Northern Transylvania, stolen away by the Dictate of Vienna.

Patrascanu also notes the fear of an important part of the bourgeoisie of "a domination by a victorious Germany." Such fears "had begun to surface in specific forms as the tendencies of the Hitlerist financial capital to take control became visible, even back in 1940. It was clear that 'German peace' would lead to the expropriation of part of the Romanian bourgeoisie. Finally, a part of the upper officer corps sided with the anti-war and anti-German opposition, driven either by their political orientation towards one or the other of the two government parties or by the conviction that the anti-Soviet war had an adventurist nature and was a lost cause."¹⁴

The result of the above is that in Patrascanu's view the fundamental categories of the Romanian bourgeoisie, including the "monopolistic" one, had no economic, political or any other type of interest in accepting the Romanian-German "alliance" and that this alliance, as well as Romania's involvement in the war, was in the final analysis the result of the total occupation and subordination of Romania to Hitlerist Germany. This idea stems also from another context in which he stated that the patriotic forces and the working class could attract the Romanian bourgeoisie or important parts of it into the struggle against Hitlerism and for the reestablishment of the country's territorial integrity and for the acquisition of national independence and sovereignty.

In the above, I tried to substantiate the hypothesis put forth at the beginning of this article which stated that Patrascanu intentionally dealt with the problem of "Romanian imperialism" in a contradictory manner in order to force the Romanian reader to discover by himself, on the basis of pro and con arguments offered by the author, as well as on the basis of his own knowledge and life experiences, the sole true conclusion: interwar Romania was the victim of imperialism and aggressive Hitlerist policies, was dragged into the war against its will and was an object in the struggle to economically and territorially redive the world between the great imperialist powers of the time.

It is to the merit of comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to have initiated a broad action to reestablish the truth regarding certain decisive moments in our country's history and the history of Romanian social, economic and political thought, and regarding the life and activities of certain valiant militants who fought for the cause of peace and the party, and to have initiated the post mortem rehabilitation of certain abuses and illegalities, including

Lucretiu Patrascanu. The study of the works of the communist Lucretiu Patrascanu demonstrates that even in the most difficult years of illegality the party had remarkable creative power and people capable of analyzing the realities and elaborating a just political line corresponding to the aspirations for progress and liberty of the much tested and brave Romanian people.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Romania on the Path of Completing Socialist Construction," Vol 1, Politica Publishing House, 1968, p 361.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in "Complete Works," Vol 27, Politica Publishing House, 1964, p 394.
3. L. D. Patrascanu, "Agrarian Reform in Romania and Its Results," in "Economic and Social-Political Studies, 1925-1945," Politica Publishing House, 1978, p 16.
4. "Documents in the History of the Romanian Communist Party, the Romanian Workers Party Publishing House, 1951, pp 117, 129.
5. Lucretiu Patrascanu, "The Basic Problems of Romania," the State Publishing House, third edition revised, Bucharest, 1946, pp 291, 313. Further, the footnotes in text refer to this work.
6. L. D. Patrascanu, "A Century of Social Unrest, 1821-1907," Politica Publishing House, 1969, pp 53, 79.
7. L. D. Patrascanu, "Under Three Dictatorships," Politica Publishing House, 1970, p 130.
8. Ibidem, p 132.
9. L. D. Patrascanu, "Economic Studies...", p 189.
10. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," Vol 27, p 351.
11. L. D. Patrascanu, "A Century of Social Unrest...", p 335.
12. L. D. Patrascanu, "Under Three Dictatorships," pp 27-28. Further, the footnotes in text refer to this work.
13. Lucretiu Patrascanu, "The Basic Problems...", p 262.
14. Ibidem, pp 14-15.

HISTORIANS COMMITTED TO PRESERVING HISTORIC TRUTH

Bucharest CONTEMPORANUL in Romanian 22 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Stefan Stefanescu, corresponding member of the Romanian Academy:
"A Vibrant Appeal Addressed to Historians"]

[Text] A few days have elapsed since a great event in the history of Romanian education--the first Congress of Education and Instruction. I still have in mind the vibrant appeal addressed to the historians, in the opening address, by the first man of the country, the president of socialist Romania, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. Together with those concerned with the other social sciences, historians are called upon to reveal, in all their grandeur, the historic realities, the profound coordinates of the affirmation and ascending development of the Romanian people and to contribute to shaping the future lines for our society and for the evolution of the entire work of the socialist construction of the country.

History has been and still is regarded as the most certain measure for determining the level of culture and civilization attained by a people. As a discipline which unites the rigor of scientific demonstration with its immense educational possibilities, history has had and still has a role of prime importance in the ideological activity of the Romanian Communist Party. The awareness of historic continuity at the level of the highest patriotic and revolutionary traditions has always been very strong in the ranks of the communists. It has inspired them in their struggle and activity and has been a source of energy and of confidence in the correctness of the road chosen. By clearly indicating the place and mission of history in the general effort for the building of the multilaterally-developed socialist society, the ideological program of the party has boldly and firmly paved the way for the elucidation, in an authentic scientific spirit, of the major problems of the history of Romania.

The requirement formulated by the secretary general of the party, that research activity in history be raised to a new level, implies the raising of the theoretical level of historical investigations, the attainment of a higher level of interpretation, the strictly objective reflection of historic truth, the treatment of the actual content of the events from the

fertile perspective of historicism, the redimensioning of some events, moments or periods formerly seen through the prism of distorting circumstances, and the rethinking and reformulation of some problems.

Historians are expected to do a vast, complex work which will lead to the mastery of factual and theoretical data of phenomena and, as a result, to the strong emphasis of the objective laws which have governed the development of our people, beginning with its acts of identification and up to the present time.

Militating for the historic truth, Romanian historiography understands that it is not only its own investigations which should be invested with this attribute; it is animated by the idea that any research which contributes to a more exact and more precise knowledge of the history of a country or of processes or events represents an act of culture. In this perspective, it highly regards all foreign research which contributes to the study of the historic past of the Romanian people. At the same time, our historiography must take a categorical and determined attitude against distortions of historic truth in regard to the past of the country and of our people. The patriotism of our historiography represents its very structure of resistance, manifesting itself in the service of the Romanian people by affirming the truth of science and conceiving relations with all peoples on the basis of respect for the great values of their culture and civilization.

From a position which combines dialectically the requirements for the respecting of historic truth with feelings of profound patriotism, guided by the desire to make history and historic truth instruments for understanding among nations, the Romanian historians are determined to affirm scientific research as a strong factor for the cohesion, by means of work and dignity, of our socialist nation and to serve the interests of friendship and collaboration among peoples.

CSO: 2700

ORIGINS OF INACTIVITY IN YOUTH ORGANIZATION TRACED

Reader's Lengthy Complaint

Zagreb POLET in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 79 pp 3-4

[Text] To the editors of POLET,

I was in a quandry about whether to send this letter to some high-level youth forum or to you. As you see, I decided to send it to you and take what comes.... The leaders in the youth organization would not in any case take me seriously; they are too high up and far away for the letter of an ordinary little youth activist to mean anything to them. Moreover, they would take it in altogether the wrong way. Perhaps they would not even read it. Do they even get letters from the rank and file?

I am a student in the third year of a secondary school center in Zagreb. I am a member of the culture commission of our youth organization, I am now on the presidium of the basic organization, and I also go to meetings of the opstina conference as well. Last year they admitted me to the League of Communists. I can say that I am fairly active.... But though I have been a youth activist for 2.5 years now, I am not satisfied with our youth organization. It all amounts to very little.

For some 10 days I have been thinking about that youth work and activism. I think it was Tito's interview in the newspaper MLADOST that started me thinking. Several of us in the basic organization of the Socialist Youth League subscribe to MLADOST, but usually we just quickly leap through it. I read Tito's interview twice. It really started me to think, and the first time I can say that I have put together some sort of views about young people and the youth organization. Since in our basic organization we do not have a habit of talking about these topics openly and in the right way (everything always turns out foolish in the end), I decided to send you these reflections of mine, and if you want to publish them, then do so, and if not, then I have still had my say.

There are some 30 pupils who are active in the basic organization of the Socialist Youth Organization [SYO] at my school. But what does this youth

commitment of ours come down to? We hold meetings and we organize various "music listening sessions," our school newspaper comes out two or three times during the school year, and for a year now we have been trying without success to obtain space for a youth club, now and then we invite some less-well-known actor or someone to give a reading.... And that is pretty much all. There is no room for any high-flown activism, sacrifice and commitment! Why has it been this way for years now? Because we are not capable of anything better or more important. But it is not all our fault.

The teachers regard us as little children. All the slogans about self-management in the school, equality, openness, at least at party meetings, about help and understanding toward the youth organization--really those are all just slogans. When we behave ourselves and when we organize harmless performances--then everything is all right. When we want to say something, when we have reason to speak out and to demand some rights--then it is not all right, then we are threatened, and the principal calls us in for talks in which we can't get a word in.

That is why many people in our youth organizations are ceasing to be active, they see that they cannot change anything, and they don't want to be anyone's fool. The student body has nothing against our activity, but they are indifferent, everything we do seems too naive to them, and they don't want to waste their time. They see no benefit from taking any part in youth work themselves.

They want everything served up to them. I understand them. Often I look naive even to myself when after 2-3 hours of a futile meeting I am late for lunch and have to listen to a boring lecture. Sometimes I think what would happen if all the students suddenly became active? If they all got together and decided on actions to carry out? Where would it end, and who then would be able to forbid us to do something?! Then the school would be quite different.... But, of course, those are dreams, there are no people in our school who would be able to get things going, there are none with that kind of ability, there are none who would be ready to make sacrifices and do that much work. That is why there is no confidence in the youth organization. Everything it does seems naive and a kind of game.

I am surprised at those few teachers who are members of the League of Communists. They do not lift a finger. Some of them are those who insist most on obedience, order and studying, but they themselves do nothing to bring up committed young party members. For them the SYO is an organization for little kids. It gets on their nerves when sometimes we get involved in a discussion. Self-management is like some unknown plant to them, for them teaching means a campaign against long hair and smoking. Incidentally, I do not know what self-management is either. I hear that word every day in various places, but I never discover its meaning where I happen to be. When I grow up and get a job, I will certainly be a great self-manager. Probably you get it with age. I would like to know what Lolo Ribar would have done in my school. Lolo certainly would have been

able to get the other young people to follow him. But he would have to work underground for a long time. He would be forced to meet in little groups in the toilets and the dark places in the school corridor. Otherwise he might get expelled for insubordination. He might even get a party reprimand....

One thing I am sure of--there is not a single future Lolo Ribar in my youth organization. And the school is not exactly working hard to bring up such a person....

My brother is close to graduation at the School of Philosophy. I have read that in the distant past university students were the leaders of the youth movement, that they were the most committed young people. My brother has told me that the university students now are sleepier than anyone. He told me how it is in his school of the university: the youth organization hardly exists at all, it works in much the same way as in my school, and party meetings are usually turned into long lamentations by a handful of smart alecks, or the roll is called without any discussion. The agendas are the same for several meetings in succession, since none of the resolutions from the past meeting has been implemented.... Why don't the university students do anything; at least they are intelligent?

"Listen, kid, you don't get it," my brother told me, "the main thing for me is to finish college as soon as possible, to make some dough and to get out of the way of these old people of ours.... I really don't have the desire or the nerve to make a revolution in this miserable youth organization of ours. Where will that get me? What changes can I make?"

You people at POLET write from time to time about young workers. I think it is really hardest for them. Playing the pinball machine I sometimes run into friends who are a bit older and who are just ordinary slagers. Sometimes we have a drink together, and what do we talk about but politics! I think that POLET ought to write much more often and much more outspokenly and critically about the life of young workers. These friends I meet playing the pinball machine say that they work twice as hard as the older slagers, but still they have lower pay, there is no chance of housing for the next 7, 8 or 10 years, they get along the best they know how.... They also told me about crooked distribution of the money, errors in the planning of production which are detected, but no one in the management is held accountable.... I asked them what the youth organization was doing there, at least there there is something concrete to fight and to strive for. They just grinned.

"In my enterprise the president of the youth organization devotes his energies toward football and excursions. He is a good kid, everyone likes him, he does what he is told, and he goes to all kinds of meetings. He once asked me why I wasn't coming to some meeting of theirs, and I told him that I would come when they put on the agenda housing and pay and distribution and self-management by the director. At that he began to stutter that they

couldn't solve those things, that that was not in their power, that the enterprise is in tough shape, and there is no sense or even any possibility.... Why should I work in an organization like that? I'm not wasting my time, I'd rather play the pinball machines than sit there during stupid meetings...."

In any case in my neighborhood all the boys meet in this dive where we have pinball machines and a pool table, and the drinks are fairly cheap. Retired people have a nice place in the headquarters of the local community, they hold meetings until midnight, they play cards in the afternoon, but ever since one New Year's they banned us "because we only break things and destroy things." Daffy old birds. It's boring in the city. The coffee-houses are horribly expensive, there are more and more of those exclusive ones for the better clientele, it's crowded everywhere, shit. There's some kind of foreign mob in the cafes, and the movies show a good film every 2 months.... It's getting worse and worse.

Shortly after your "Big Ben" we had a meeting about young people's free time at the opstina conference. The comrades who run the youth organization remembered to put that on the agenda. For 3 hours we debated the need for establishing new youth clubs. We could debate it every day, but still over the next 10 years we would open only one club in the entire city. Or it would happen like 2 years ago: when in the center of the city we discovered a basement just perfect for a youth club, and we even had the money, all of a sudden a Chinese restaurant opened up in that basement. It works like the Mafia. The opstina organization was no longer able to do anything except to keep on summoning the poor activists to meetings....

I could write you a lot about what I think about the people who hold professional positions in the youth organization. Tito was completely right, and I am glad that he spoke frankly, as always, in saying what he thought about young people. I know this is true from some of those officials I have seen....

They seem to be further and further away from young people and seem to understand less and less. Do they even know where the young people go at night, how they live, is it possible that they should have forgotten so quickly where they came from. They would never have heard of "Big Ben" if you had not put one over on them and they had not had to react in their own way, late and from on high, when everything was over. The main thing is for them to have their papers, to sit in on important meetings in the committee, to run off as soon as someone higher up calls for them to report on their generation the way they think reports should be given--moderate, nicely, without problems. Most youth leaders like this job very much, they behave like born politicians, they are hard to get ahold of, they always have something more important to do.... They rarely want to go back where they came from. They really are like our representatives up there where there is no place for us. And they are never at fault. Of course, they are working like horses, they are really changing the position of young

people. What are they doing? They would like it best if the shortcomings in the youth organization led to dismissal of young people rather than their own dismissal.

I know you probably will not publish this. But it doesn't matter, I had to write it, because I really think that the young people's leaders in my opstina don't do anything but copy old papers, embellish old positions in new materials and hold meetings. They have neither the strength nor the will to fight outspokenly for the things we elected them for (if we really did elect them): for them to be the most outspoken and the most militant of us all in the struggle for the essential things, for a better position for young people in this society.... But no—by no means, leaders like that are very rare among them. In my opstina there are more careerists than honest and true leaders of young people.

Why is it like that? Why is our youth organization that way? Why do the leaders of young people behave that way? Why is Tito not satisfied with the work of the youth organization? Why does the SYO not feel the real pulse of young people? Why don't young people have more faith in their organization? Why do they not speak about problems more openly? Why are we marking time? Are the leaders of the young people the only ones at fault?

Recently I have mulled these questions over a great deal. Nor have you editors at POLET been excessively open and committed concerning these issues.... I think that the League of Communists has also failed here. Recently I read the Resolution of the Third LCY Conference, which was held in 1972 and was devoted to young people. At that time I was a kid, but it seems to me that we could reiterate many of the resolutions of that conference even today.... In my opinion the League of Communists has done little to carry out those resolutions. Why? Why is it constantly said that our party is one of the youngest in the world, yet does so little to alter the position of the young generation? Neither our party nor our society needs a peaceful and half-dead youth and youth organization.

I think there is an important connection between the observation that young people do not have much faith in their youth organization and the fact that society does not have much faith in young people. Is it better to let our young people sleep and be passive or to open up as much room as possible for them to become involved in the struggle and to commit themselves?

Are our young people going to sleep through the stabilization and the inflation and all the other problems afflicting our society? I think that it is the young people who will be the most sensitive to these difficulties, just as the young people have always in the past borne the brunt of the housing problem, the problem of jobs, the problem of income.... So when we are the ones who feel those things the most, why shouldn't we be able to try to solve them? It's always someone else who is solving them, and it appears that they still need some help, since things are not going exactly great. They always think that they can do without us, that it is better

for us to be quiet, and yet things don't go like they should.... It is intolerable to allow young people to turn away from everything. Our young people are in favor of socialism, self-management, a better economic policy, but they want to be part of it, and not left out.

Are young people in a position where they can make democratic decisions on an equal footing and thereby take on their part of the responsibility? Kardelj once said that a man can be free only if he assumes responsibility for his freedom.... How many of our young people are not free?

A great many young people have become completely passive and think only about their own private lives and are not concerned about anything else at all. They see no way toward stronger commitment through this kind of youth organization, the way it is conceived. Society pretends not to feel this, as if that suits it just fine, as if it will not feel it in the future. And what will happen? All of a sudden they will discover that we are not to be found. And then? Nothing--the old people will no longer be able, and the young people will not know because they do not have experience. And then we will be able to have our pictures taken.... Forgive me if I am caricaturing, but I really am afraid of young people who have been lulled to sleep like this. What's the point of so much schooling, when we have no occasion to apply it?

I had a sense from Tito's interview that Tito was angry and his anger was not addressed only toward the youth organization. After the interview those people of mine in the opstina conference stirred around quite a bit and began to do something.... I heard that there would soon be a LCY plenum on young people. I hope that the talk at the plenum will be fairly open about young people, about their organization and about the party's attitude toward young people. The time has come when it is clear the kind of position our young people are in and when it is probably clear that we don't need sleepy young people.

Sincerely yours,
Zoran

Another Reader Agrees

Zagreb POLET in Serbo-Croatian 26 Dec 79 p 2

[Text] I have carefully read issue No 114 of POLET and I liked best the letter on pages 4-5. I can tell you that your reader Zoran is right. On several occasions I have come into contact with my opstina conference of the Socialist Youth League of Croatia, and it seems to me, forgive me if I am overcritical, that it is nothing but a den of good-for-nothings and even alcoholics. They spend the whole year doing nothing but sitting and tippling (from the stock kept for entertaining visitors) and telling dirty jokes, and they become "active" only when a NNMI [expansion unknown] or similar event is going on. They publish some kind of idiotic bulletin

prepared by some lads whose ambitions are in inverse proportion to their abilities, they pinch each other and guffaw. They routinely and cleverly do those jobs whose results are clearly visible to the general public, which is to say that they meet the formal conditions for their existence, but there is no real benefit from all this.

I know nothing about rock or about the films, nor about the theater, but I am certain that it would be much more beneficial if the rooms where the "activists" (read: retarded p---d-for-nothings) are now getting drunk were turned over to some band, amateur filmmakers or dramatic club. Am I overcritical?

Rajko Privrat
Zagreb

Editors' note: Yes, you are overcritical, but we agree with some of the points you make.

7045
CSO: 2800

SLOVENE UNDERREPRESENTATION IN DIPLOMATIC CORPS EXPLORED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1514, 13 Jan 80
pp 15-16

[Article by Dusan Dimitrijevic]

[Text] After nearly 8 years the editors of the newspaper DELO of Ljubljana have just decided once again to explore publicly the reasons why Slovenia is not realizing certain important interests in our consular and diplomatic service. It is a fact, that is, that the share of personnel from this republic in the diplomatic service--supervisory personnel are an exception--is dropping constantly. It is obvious that this work is not attractive (by contrast to the situation in certain other of our republics), especially to young people, since nowhere a sufficient number of scholarship-holders from Slovenia take jobs after graduation in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs; rather they have found jobs in Ljubljana, usually in administrative agencies and the public services.

Why that is the case, why young people refuse to go into the diplomatic service, and why they are reluctant to go to Belgrade were the questions that interested DELO in conversations with several distinguished representatives in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Executive Council of Slovenia, the Central Committee of the Slovenian League of Communists, the Slovenian Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People, with Slovenians who have worked in the diplomatic service and with those who are now trainees and scholarship-holders from Slovenia for the diplomatic service.

"There is no real justification for young people from Slovenia not wanting to work in the diplomatic service and for their not being prepared for life in Belgrade," believes Mitja Strukel', secretary of the Council for International Relations of the Republic Conference of the SAWP, who has worked as embassy secretary in Buenos Aires, and he adds:

"What has always turned the trainees away is the impersonal attitude toward the beginner and lack of security concerning the future. Today, however, the period of training has already been appreciably shortened so that some

of my colleagues have already completed a major portion of the tests after 6 months."

Difficulties in Adapting--Or Personal Incomes?

One could also conclude in this interview that young Slovenians are reluctant to decide in favor of the diplomatic service because they have trouble adapting to life in our capital and also because of low personal incomes in the diplomatic service. It is obvious that it is more attractive from the material standpoint to be a business representative abroad.

"Fear about finding a place to live and personal incomes were among the principal reasons why those colleagues who did not want to go to Belgrade decided against the diplomatic service. Nor is there anyone in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs who would provide you with some explanation or start you off in the right direction," is the feeling of Borut Mahnic, a trainee in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs.

Gojka Jekos, another trainee, thinks differently:

"The material aspect has been somehow straightened out, the more painful thing is for the scholarship-holder to cut the umbilical cord with his native republic when he starts to work in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs."

"As personnel from Slovenia do you receive a housing supplement and a supplement for traveling home?" the newsmen of DELO asked.

"Yes, they even receive the difference in personal incomes, which means the difference between their personal incomes in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs and the income which they would receive as trainees in Slovenia. In addition they have one paid trip per month, or even weekly if they have a family. Special expenses are acknowledged and there is a contribution for rent if the rent is too high," stresses Ljubo Butinar, assistant secretary in the Secretariat for Personnel Affairs of the Slovenian Executive Council.

"It is true that we receive quite a bit of compensation of that kind," says Gojka Jekos, "but if we sum up all aspects of the position, it is still not an enviable one compared with the position of corresponding personnel in Slovenia. The trainee's personal income ranges about 4,900 dinars, and all my supplements total up to 2,650 dinars, which is the level of real costs. It still takes idealism...."

Intentions To Go Abroad

In explaining why after an 8-month stay in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs he returned to Slovenia Marko Kromar, independent adviser in the Secretariat for Personnel Affairs of the Slovenian Executive Council (he was a scholarship-holder of the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs), said:

"Unlike many of my colleagues, it was my 'luck' to be married. There was no place for my family to live, and it was an illusion to expect to find a job for my wife in Belgrade. Then there was education for the children. Should I leave my family in Ljubljana? You become frightened of all that and find it easier to return...."

"Are all those who have 'fled' now lost to the diplomatic service?"

"Mostly they are employed in republic administrative agencies, and most of them are candidates to go abroad," Butinar said. "There is also something else here: it seems to them smarter to spend 5 years waiting in Slovenia and then go directly to a post as second secretary in a mission."

"Is the diplomatic service attractive, then, for Slovenians or not?" the editors of DELO insisted.

"For me the diplomatic service was attractive. I feel that there would be many more candidates for that work if it was not necessary to go to Belgrade," is the feeling of Edo Razberger, director of the international relations department of Ljubljana Bank (he was the economic adviser of our embassy in Vienna). "I lived a normal life with my personal income, though a business representative in Vienna gets \$2,000 and the economic adviser of the embassy \$1,400...."

There Are Few Slovenians, Macedonians ... in the Diplomatic Service

Marko Kosin, assistant secretary in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, feels that it is very good and worthwhile for Slovenia to provide scholarships for young people to work in the diplomatic service. Much the same is done, incidentally, by the other republics as well, except for Serbia.

"In our Secretariat we note a phenomenon which does not apply only to Slovenians," Kosin says. "There are also very few Macedonians. We have hardly any Albanians. There are also few Moslems, and even the share of Croats is dropping all the time. Fewer and fewer young people from those places are deciding, then, in favor of the diplomatic service, since there are many problems involved."

"The personal incomes abroad are low," Kosin feels. "The base is \$380, which in every country is increased in view of the level of the cost of living.... The position is especially difficult for beginners. The housing of diplomats is also paid for up to a certain amount, and a special supplement is also paid for countries where the climate is bad and difficult."

"... Our business representatives in the developing countries have a personal income that is approximately one-third higher than that of the ambassador in the country," says Franc Pristovsek, secretary of the International

Affairs Commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Slovenian League of Communists (he has been a consul in Vienna and Bonn).

"A worker who lays asphalt and is employed by a Yugoslav enterprise in Libya has higher pay than our ambassador!" Kosin adds.

Representation of the Republics and Provinces in Personnel With Senior Postsecondary Training (not including trainees) in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (as of 31 December 1976)

		<u>Share, %</u>
Total	475	100
Bosnia-Herzegovina	64	13
Montenegro	57	12
Croatia	97	20
Macedonia	31	7
Serbia proper	143	30
Vojvodina	35	7
Kosovo	30	6
Slovenia	18	4

They Receive Their Salary, But Do Not Work

The newsmen from DELO asked in this connection whether the reason for the personal incomes like these were not the fact that in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs there are many unassigned people who are receiving salaries?

"There are two problems here," Kosin feels. "One is the problem of unassigned personnel, and the other is the makeup of these personnel.... In the Secretariat at present there are 61 diplomats who formally do not have a post. They include 40 former heads of diplomatic and consular missions. The problem, then, is that there are more supervisory posts abroad than in the country.... Unless we have consistent enforcement of the federal law under which the republics must take over these supervisory personnel after 1 year, they remain in our Secretariat. We are tolerant toward those who have been in this service more than 30 years. A more important problem is the number of personnel whom the times have passed by, who are not suitable for the diplomatic service. Many of them have done creditable service, quite a few of them held responsible positions several years ago. There are some 90 of them."

"Has Slovenia decided this problem?"

"So well in fact that the problem with Slovenians is that there are none of them," Kosin says.

The insufficient number of Slovenians in the diplomatic service is obviously not only a Slovenian problem, nor is it so easy or simple to solve. It is

also obvious that in spite of the steady increase in the number of people in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs and at diplomatic posts abroad--our diplomatic service has increased by one-third since 1973--this service has not kept pace with the times: the personnel question is not what it might be, earnings are not always the result of work and effort, there are those who do not have the knowledge of foreign languages they should...." it was observed in the round-table discussion organized by DELO, and the conclusion was that the uneven representation of members of the various nationalities and ethnic minorities is also a problem.

7045

CSO: 2800

EQUATING CATHOLICISM WITH CROATIAN NATION TERMED DANGEROUS TO SOCIALISM

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 80 p 5

[Article by Nenad Ivankovic: "More Politics Than Religion"]

[Excerpts] Where in the Christian world did the rumor start that the Catholic church in Croatia is thwarting ecumenism in this part of Europe? The VERITAS journal (Journal of Anthony of Padua No 2, 1980) tried to answer this question under the title "Are Croats the Black Sheep of Ecumenism?" in an interview with Dr Jurje Kolaric, secretary of the Council of Ecumenism at the Bishops' Conference in Yugoslavia, who recently represented our country in Rome at the third meeting of representatives of the national ecumenic councils.

He believes that non-theological reasons are to blame for the slow progress of ecumenism in our country and that there is urgent need to separate "the religious question from the nationality question."

He says that it is completely wrong to reduce Orthodoxy to the Serbian nationality, for example, "to equalize Catholicism with the Croatian nation." Doctor Kolaric concludes that "according to this erroneous thinking a real Croat could only be Catholic, and a real Serb could only be Orthodox. Thus Catholicism was erroneously proclaimed the 'Croatian' religion and Orthodoxy the 'Serbian' religion. Such equating brought the attempts of mutual rapprochement to a deadend and [made] all ecumenic action senseless."

Although there are views in the interview which deserve special critical attention (for example, a totally unacceptable and politically dangerous thesis that the Croats allegedly renounced "their nationality, their name and language, only so that they would create a large community of South Slav people," and that the reduction of Orthodoxy to the Serbian nationality is the main and only reason for equating Catholicism with the Croatian nationality), the opinion of Dr Kolaric on the urgent need to separate religious questions from nationality questions is very significant, especially as an antipode to the thesis that the religious and the national are identical, [the thesis] which has recently been supported by a part of the clergy in Croatia with special fervor.

Therefore, by avoiding generalizations, one should say that recently there has been a more expressed form of deviations from the [Vatican] Council line and from our constitutional and political principles which is precisely what Dr Kolaric stated as the main reason for which the Catholic church in our country received the epithete of "the one which thwarts ecumenism."

What is involved is the fact that the proponents of the idea of equating the religious with the national are trying to prove that the national and the religious history are identical, for example, [that there is] an organic link of the church with the Croatian people, and accordingly, the thesis that the church is the only true bearer of the nation and expounder of national interests. They say that the church was, is, and will be the essential basic factor of the Croatian national being, or, more precisely, the regimes are changing, but the Catholic church remains. The meaning is clear: the Catholic religion is explained as the basis of the Croatian nation, its culture and history, and therefore as an alternative future of the Croatian people. The political consequences of this clerical-nationalism become obvious when one links it [this clerical-nationalism] to its original thesis: that, considering the century-long link of the Catholic church in Croatia with Rome, the Croats as a nation have definitely sided with the West. And it is indeed not difficult to discern what is hidden behind such a position.

However, there are efforts to use such Catholic integration (insistence on regarding the Croatian nation and the church as identical, and on explaining Catholicism as a world teacher and a value system which is self-sufficient) in order to prevent the differences of opinion within the church community itself so that the large number of those priests and believers who wish to adjust the church to our social relations, in accordance with the Constitution, law, etc., would be thwarted. This is why it is not surprising that the Council's principles (dialog with the modern world, recognition that all the human and social values were not created by Christianity alone, but also by other social movements and forces, distinction between the doctrine and the social movements, etc.) are being abandoned and that a crusade is waged against those intra-church forces which do not accept such ideology (the ill-fated Association of Catholic Clergy of the Socialist Republic of Croatia attests eloquently to this).

Of course, what is involved here is not only abandoning of the Council's line, but a blatant negation of our internal and foreign policy, all of which deserve special attention and deep analysis. But, what is important to us is to point to the fact that such behavior is not at all a *modus procedendi* unanimously accepted by all the clergy and believers (as they try to portray), but that there is a strong opposition within the church itself to this socially dangerous ideology.

TEXT OF 'BORBA' ARTICLE SCORING BULGARIAN ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

AU150700 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 80 p 7 AU

[Commentary by Zoran Mandzuka: "Appeal of the Old Dreams"]

[Text] In a period of more than a century, in the times of numerous and multifarious changes and despite the changes, Sofia's officeholders remain immovable in one respect: For 102 years they have maintained and strengthened their San Stefano dream. A dream of great Bulgaria. Adventurous mental leaps are being performed on the ruins of what is old and stubborn in the belief that "something new" will make it possible for the century-old dream finally to come true and narrow national interests and wide territorial pretensions to be achieved.

This is again being done in Sofia this March and, as if following a rule, our country is again being assaulted through historical events that might have been solely Bulgarian were they not transformed into sharp anti-Yugoslav ones. And again, according to an established rule, Yugoslavia is being attacked as it was innumerable times earlier, especially in the period since 1968, precisely at a time when our foreign political activities and internal stability are once again being fully confirmed in the world.

Appropriations

What do the Sofia officeholders tend to?

At the beginning of this week, at a central square in Sofia, in front of the beautiful building of the National Assembly, a multitude of citizens responded to a call of the authorities to mark the 102d anniversary of the San Stefano treaty, a 3-month creation of long duration which was set up in March 1878 when, with guns trained on Istanbul, tsarist Russia forced Turkey to agree to an expansion of the borders of Russian domination, which was also reflected in the fictitious creation of a greater Bulgaria with its borders from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to the Albanian mountains. The treaty remained fictitious because it not only was not implemented but was explicitly repealed 3 months later by a decision of the Berlin congress. The San Stefano treaty was thus renounced by all, including Russia and Turkey, all except Bulgaria.

The firmness of the link of greater Bulgarian chauvinism on the one hand and the resolve of the then tsarist power to decide on the fate of other peoples on the other could perhaps have been explained a century ago. The trouble, however, lies in the fact that the post-war development of events (despite or precisely because of the short period of Georgi Dimitrov) has confirmed several times over that the break with greater Bulgarian nationalism would probably be easier had it been exclusively linked with the monarchy and the bourgeois class. The events--manifested in the post-war renaissance and firmness of the San Stefano dream--indicate that the sources of the fatal vitality of Bulgarian nationalism also exist in other communities.

In the square in front of the National Assembly--to return to this week--the lives and works of Goce Delcev, Janeta Sandanski and Dame Gruje were again commemorated; they have, as they exclaim in Sofia, "given their lives for the liberation of Bulgaria."

Does one need any better example of the striving to reduce the revolutionary struggle of the three Macedonians for free Macedonia into narrow frameworks limited by nationalism? It is not enough for those in Sofia.

Pretensions

On the eve of and on 3 March this year Bulgarian television assured itself and its viewers that the San Stefano decisions "determined the ethnic borders" of Bulgaria, while the solutions of the Berlin congress were assessed as "fatal and unfortunate decisions." What should be done then--one should ask--to "correct the fatal decisions?" A partial answer has been given recently by Dimitur Angelov, corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, who noted that the basic aim of the famous daily politicking volume "Makedonija" is to "discover the historic fate of the people of Macedonia," from which it follows that in the process of the development and formation of the Bulgarian nation in the Middle Ages, Macedonia, clearly appeared as "the third basic territorial nucleus" in addition to Thrace and Mezia. The volume, D.A. says, precisely demonstrates "the belonging of the people in Macedonia to Bulgaria."

The question must be asked: Is that not a clear and precise statement of territorial pretensions against the SFRY? Sofia, of course, officially denies it. At the same time, such denials are denied by other, less and less hidden statements. Thus, for instance "Literaturen Front," in a peculiar linguistic-political manipulation, writer V. Aleksandrov denies the existence of the Macedonian language, presenting it as a "dialect of Bulgarian" or as a "local vernacular"; on the other hand, Nikolay Todorov, self-styled historian and Bulgarian ambassador in Greece, speaking about the "Bulgarian nature of Macedonia," concludes that "Yugoslavia has internationalized the 'Macedonian question' and undertaken a falsification of historical facts out of euphoria and chauvinism"; and in a third instance, Academician Khristov in the journal SEPTEMBRI poses the question of the need to study the fate of the "Bulgarian population in present-day Vardar

Macedonia"; the thesis of "integral Bulgarian Macedonia and the population which forever has belonged and belongs to Bulgaria," made official and strengthened in socialist Bulgaria, is on many sides persistently and daily elaborated, with a production that considerably exceeds in its efficiency all other fields, and is transformed in a petty politicking way in the so-called "historical society" in which more than 3,000 scientists of various branches are gathered....

Bulgarian children now learn about "Macedonia as a present Bulgarian land," and Bulgarian politicians, like Tsola Dragoycheva, for instance--her "Memoirs" undoubtedly constitute one of the fullest contributions to the perception of the unabated Bulgarian nationalism--directly attack the constitutional foundations of the SFRY.

[AU150701] The decisions of AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia]--Tsola Dragoycheva officially points out--constitute a "solution imposed on the Macedonians." The question--Sofia officeholders suggest--has not been solved yet, it should be--they tell us--reopened as a "Balkan question"; it should be solved, Ts. Dragoycheva believes, "solved by the Balkan communist parties with the support of the Soviet Union."

What then is Sofia appealing to? The answer is clear. It is clear that such an approach by Sofia--which remains naked despite some of Sofia's efforts to cover up its daily practice with a cloak of declared readiness to conclude a document of one sort or another--more and more rapidly confirms the belief that the differences between Yugoslav and Bulgarian positions are a result of something more than a different concept of the minority question.

Opposites

Although the differences in the treatment of national minorities--that is also confirmed by the present example--are most frequently an expression of the key attitude toward the equality of peoples in general, the Sofia approach seems to go even further. Above all and most of all, it stands in strong contrast to the demands of time and clashes with the well-known principles of international cooperation and good neighborliness also affirmed in the final act of Helsinki.

As to Yugoslavia, our unchanged and consistent position was set as early as 1944 when our country turned to cooperation with Bulgaria, not as with a former ally of the Hitlerite coalition but as with a country that took the road of building socialism. Good neighborliness, after all, is constantly at the very center of Yugoslav activities and our conviction that a comprehensive and fruitful development of relations can be based only on well-known foundations--the principles of independence, equality, territorial integrity, mutual respect and consideration for the differences in international position and the internal development of each country--is being confirmed and realized in practice daily.

SIZE, POPULATION, OTHER FEATURES OF OPSTINAS SURVEYED

Belgrade KOMUNA in Serbo-Croatian No 11, Nov 79 pp 21-24

[Article by Dr Lazar Durovski: "The Constitutional and the Actual Status of the Opstinas in the SFRY Today"]

[Excerpt] Under the constitution of the SFRY all opstinas enjoy equal rights as elements of Yugoslavia's social and political system, that is to say, they all possess the same constitutional status. We are here referring to the principle of the uniform opstina in Yugoslavia, a principle which was first laid down in 1955. This is also the reason for the use of the term opstina uniformity or the uniform organization of the opstina as one of the fundamental characteristics of our communal system of government. For the time being, the only exceptions to this rule are the cities of Belgrade, Zabreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Skopje, which are classified as municipal associations of opstinas and autonomous sociopolitical communities. However, it can also be said that a process has already been initiated with a view to conferring this organizational status on yet another group of cities, i.e., Novi Sad, Nis, Maribor, Banja Luka, Rijeka, Split, Osijek and others. It remains to be seen what the ultimate political configuration of these cities will look like and when this will take place.

But regardless of the fact that the Constitution stipulates that all opstinas, (large and small, developed and underdeveloped, those which are predominantly agricultural and those which are primarily industrial) possess the same constitutional status, the fact remains that they do differ from one another in actual practice.¹ These differences are readily discernible not only in terms of territorial size, population and the number of population centers, but also in terms of the level and structure of economic and other categories of development (the level of the concentration of socially owned means of production, the number of workers employed in the public sector, per capita income and aggregate opstina income, the level of education and social consciousness, literacy, the distribution and organization of educational, cultural, health care, social, hospitality and other vitally necessary public institutions, the degree to which community needs are fulfilled in these areas, and so on). In short, in real life there is no such thing as an "average" opstina. On the contrary, it could be said that

diversity is one of the most prominent characteristics of the opstinas in present-day Yugoslavia. In order to illustrate the kind of diversity that exists in Yugoslavia's opstinas as they are presently constituted and in the communal system as a whole we will now proceed to discuss some of these distinguishing factors in greater detail.²

The Territorial Area of Yugoslavia's Opstinas

The biggest distinction that differentiates one opstina from another is the area of the territory which they occupy. The average opstina territorial area now amounts to approximately 500 square kilometers.³ However, there are many deviations from this average territorial area and they are readily discernible. Consequently, it would be a good idea to point out some of these differences, inasmuch as there is one opstina whose territory amounts to no more than a few square kilometers. There are some opstinas whose territorial areas range between a few square kilometers (as a rule, these are highly urbanized opstinas with a full range of municipal services and institutions) and several tens of kilometers. However, there are also opstinas whose territorial areas exceeds 1,200 square kilometers (usually those which are underdeveloped in terms of road communications and which are relatively underpopulated).⁴ There now exist opstinas which in terms of territorial area (and in other respects as well) are larger than the srezes which used to form a part of Yugoslavia's territorial-political system.⁵ Thus, the opstina of Niksic, with a territorial area of 2,065 square kilometers, is the largest opstina in the country and in this respect represents a sort of curious anomaly.

The Number of Population Centers in Yugoslavia's Opstinas

A comparative survey of opstinas in terms of the number of their population centers offers yet another indication of the diversity of Yugoslavia's opstinas. On the average, every opstina comprises 54 population centers. However, to this day there are opstinas which are nothing more than sections of single urban units.⁶ On the other hand, there are 60 opstinas whose territories comprises a hundred or more population centers.⁷ In this regard the opstina of Novo Mesto with its 354 population centers is another oddity. In opstinas with this large a number of population centers, especially when these centers are widely scattered and are furnished with an underdeveloped communications network, the question always arises as to whether or not they are really and truly doing a proper job of representing the common interests of the working people and citizens and their self-management associations.

Population

Marked differences also exist among the opstinas in terms of their respective populations. The average opstina population amounts to approximately 42,500.⁸ However, there are still opstinas with populations of less than 5,000.⁸ On the other hand, there are 30 opstinas with populations of over

100,000. Here we are talking primarily about that category of opstinas which at the present time prefer to be organized as municipal associations of opstinas.

But the listing of opstina population figures is only the quantitative side of a problem which lends itself to precise measurement, in addition to making it possible place the opstinas into large, intermediate and small categories. However, when it comes to making a judgement about the effectiveness of the working of the political system of socialist self-management in all opstinas the qualitative aspect of this indicator is of greater significance. In this regard there arises a wide range of questions which are indicative of the complexity of the socioeconomic and political relations that exist in the opstinas, e.g., questions related to trends and changes in underlying structures of society, the level of "employment," in which the problem of unemployment is also implicit, migratory population shifts inside and outside the country, the level of public education, and so on.

By comparing the territorial area, number of population centers and populations of today's opstinas with the conditions that prevailed in these respects in 1955, when the communal system was first "established," it can be seen that there has been a very marked tendency toward frequent and fairly extensive territorial-political changes and the creation of large opstinas, just as it is equally clear that this tendency has largely "moderated" during the last 10 years. During the past 24 years there has been an almost three-fold decline in the number of Yugoslavia's opstinas--from 1,479 opstinas and 107 srezes in 1955 to 525 opstinas in 1979. consequently, today's opstinas (in terms of their territorial areas, populations and number of population centers--taking into account both the geographic and demographic dimensions of this problem) did not spring up all of a sudden out of nowhere, but are rather the product of a 30-year development process and the numerous territorial-political reforms that were carried out during this period.

The Growth in the Area, Number of Population Centers and Population and the Decline in the Total Number of Opstinas

As a result of the multiple territorial-political changes that were made during the aforementioned period, the average area of the opstinas underwent a three-fold increase not only in terms of the territorial area which they occupy (from 173 square kilometers in 1955 to 496 square kilometers in 1979), but also in terms of the number of population centers--increasing from 19 population centers per opstina in 1955 to 54 population centers in 1979. The magnitude of this transformation becomes even more apparent when we compare average population figures per opstina. For example, in 1955 the average opstina had a population of 11,453, while in 1979 the average opstina had a population of 42,500.

The same figures, presented in a different manner, further testify to the

dramatic increase in the physical size of the opstinas that has occurred in the last 20 years. For example, in 1955 there were 279 opstinas, or 19 percent of the total number of opstinas that existed at that time, which had populations of less than 5,000, whereas in 1979 there was a total of only 4 opstinas or 0.8 percent of the total number, that fell into this category; in 1955 there were in all 64 opstinas, or 4.32 percent of the total number, with populations in excess of 30,000, whereas in 1979 there were 236 opstinas, or 47.2 percent of the total number, which fell into this category.

These same kinds of conclusions concerning the formation of large opstinas are arrived at by comparing figures on the territorial area and number of population centers of opstinas in 1955 and 1979.

More significant variations in relation to the Yugoslav average can also be observed when one makes a comparative survey of the opstinas in terms of territorial area, number of population centers and aggregate populations on the larger scale of the relationships among the various socialist republics. In this case the largest opstina territorial areas are to be found in Macedonia (756 km²) and in Montenegro (691 km²) and the smallest in Slovenia (372 km²). The most populous opstinas are in Macedonia (with average population of 48,417) and in Serbia (with an average population of 46,929), and the smallest average populations in relation to the nationwide average are to be found in Montenegro (26,500) and Slovenia (28,783). Slovenia has the largest average number of opstina population centers (100), while Serbia has the smallest (34).

The sharp reduction in the total number of opstinas between 1955 and the present has led not only to an increase in the territorial areas, populations, and number of population centers in all opstinas, but has also brought about major changes in the social and economic status of most of these opstinas, a fact which is indicative of one of the key features in the development of the opstinas and communal system of government in Yugoslavia as a whole. This "radical" process encompassing the process of the territorial-political transformation of the opstinas and the communal system of government, a process which has completely altered the former political geography of Yugoslavia, is in a certain sense all but unprecedented in the history of our country.¹⁰ This process was an especially characteristic feature of the period after 1955 and it persisted up until 1968. In the judgement of professor Dr Jovan Dordevic this was a period of historic importance in the evolution of the Yugoslav opstina, especially so from the standpoint of "national unification" and the consolidation of the territories of the former opstinas into the new opstinas.¹¹

Do Any Firm and Objective Criteria Exist for Determining the Geographic Areas, Number of Population Centers, and Aggregate Populations of the Opstinas?

The aforementioned facts, in spite of the unsystematic manner in which they have been presented within the context of this article, still testify in

on uncertain terms to the urgency of the issue of the geographic area of Yugoslavia's present opstinas. Along these lines one is entitled to ask the following question: how far would things have gone if the process of territorial-political changes would have continued on the same scale and with the same intensity that was characteristic of the preceding 10 years? Will the process encompassing the formation of large opstinas in Yugoslavia continue and how long will it last? Does the status quo with respect to the geographic area of Yugoslavia's opstinas need to be reexamined on a broader scale, or, conversely, is it true that all we need to do is make minor adjustments in the opposite direction?

Is it really possible to talk about "local communities" with reference to certain of Yugoslavia's opstinas which now have populations in excess of 200,000? For that matter what does it mean and what good is it to confer the same constitutional status on Novi Sad and Opatovac, Maribor and Lenart, Nis and Gadzin Hana, and so on and so forth as modern Yugoslav opstinas? Are there any solid grounds of an objective nature for doing so and, if there are, to what extent were they taken into account in the course of implementing the territorial-political changes of the past 20 years?

In short, these three factors (territorial area, the number of population centers and total population) have a very important role to play in interpreting the true status of Yugoslavia's present opstinas insofar as they are indicative of the geographic and demographic dimensions of these territorial-political units. However, those factors which attest to the level and structure of the economic and general social development of Yugoslavia's opstinas are even more significant.

Differences also exist among the various opstinas in terms of the level and structure of their economic development. This fact is clearly substantiated by the following rundown of general economic indicators, a detailed analysis of which, however, exceeds the scope of this article.

The Concentration of Socially Owned Productive Fixed Assets at the Opstina Level

For example, a comparative survey of the material foundations of today's opstinas reveals that sharp differences exist with respect to the concentration of socially owned productive fixed assets and in terms of the value of fixed productive assets in the public sector. There are some opstinas in which the value of these assets amounts to less than 10 million dinars.¹² However, one could also draw up a list of some 40 opstinas in which the value of these assets exceeds 2 billion dinars.¹³ Within this category one could single out 10 opstinas which, judging by our standards and conditions, could be described as real "economic giants." And here too, when it comes to the level of the concentration of socially owned fixed productive assets, there are several urban opstinas which outrank all the other opstinas by a wide margin.¹⁴

The volume of resources held in the public sector plays a very important role in determining the real status of the opstinas, inasmuch as these resources are the material foundations on which the overall superstructure of opstina self-management and political organizations rests. It goes without saying that all of this has a tremendous impact on employment, per capita income and aggregate opstina income, the volume of opstina budget revenues, and so on.

The Level of Employment in the Public Sector at the Opstina Level

A comparative survey of conditions in our present opstina system reveals by the same token that significant differences also exist among them with respect to the total number of citizens employed in the public sector, especially in industry. There exist in Yugoslavia today some 50 opstinas with less than 1,000 employed citizens. Within this category one could single out some 40 opstinas in which the number of persons employed in industry is very small or even negligible.¹⁵ What is more, the official statistics indicate that there are opstinas in which not a single citizen is employed in industry.¹⁶ On the other hand, the same statistics indicate that there are 66 opstinas with more than 16,000 citizens employed in industrial jobs. And in this category one can find opstinas with more than 50,000 citizens employed in industrial jobs.¹⁷ It is not very hard to prove that opstinas with high levels of employment are much better off than opstinas in which the level of employment is very low. And in the latter case most citizens are employed in jobs outside the public sector.

The consequences of this situation are many and varied. One such consequence, attributable to the underdevelopment of the productive forces and the lack of job opportunities in "home" opstinas, is manifested in the tendency of the native population to migrate to other opstinas. Understandably, these migratory movements are an important and urgent issue facing not only the underdeveloped opstinas and certain microrregions within these opstinas, but also society as a whole. The best proof of this is the fact that in recent years the responsible (executive) organs of our society have begun to play a direct role in the process of trying to comprehend the dimensions of this problem and undertaking concrete measures and actions in several areas in an effort to deal with it.

Major differences exist between those opstinas which have large concentrations of socially owned productive fixed assets and several tens of thousands of their citizens employed in the public sector and those opstinas in which these resources are more or less nonexistent and levels of employment extremely low regardless of the fact that all of them enjoy equal status as elements of Yugoslavia's social and political system in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the SFRY. For this reason there are only a few opstinas which can claim to have become full-fledged self-management communities and genuine social collectives; some opstinas are making a start in this direction in pace with their general material, social, political and cultural conditions. However, there are still some opstinas which, even

though they consider themselves to be self-managing and basic sociopolitical communities under the terms of the Constitution, are more so in name and by constitutional definition than they are in reality. Naturally, there is no such thing as an ideal political system, nor is it to be expected that this will ever be achieved. The concept of the opstina can live with the real world when it comes to questions of material and general social development, but the point is that this reality should be subject to change and transcendence. As professor dr Jovan Dordevic has pointed out, the transformation of the opstinas into basic territorial and living communities is one of the most important ways in which we should go about giving real substance to these key institutions of self-management and of the sociopolitical system of Yugoslavia as a whole.¹⁸

Aggregate Opstina Income, Per Capita Income and Budget Revenues

Noticeable differences also show up from opstina to opstina when they are ranked according to their aggregate incomes. There are some opstinas with aggregate incomes of less than 25 million dinars.¹⁹ Conversely, there are 70 opstinas with aggregate incomes in excess of 600 million dinars.²⁰

Similar findings are arrived at when opstinas are compared in terms of per capita income. For example, there are some opstinas in which per capita income is less than 1,500 dinars, but there are other opstinas with per capita incomes of more than 10,000 dinars.

Some obvious and very striking differences also exist when it comes to the level of the budget revenues of individual opstinas. For example, there are some opstinas with budget revenues amounting to approximately 3 million dinars, while certain other opstinas have budget revenues in excess of 50 million dinars.

Subsidized Opstinas

The varying levels of material development of today's opstinas give rise to a number of different consequences. One of these consequences is reflected in the fact that a large number of opstinas are now receiving supplementary financial assistance, that is to say, their public finances are being subsidized. This is a typical arrangement in many opstinas in all republics, with the exception of Slovenia. In some opstinas subsidies account for more than 50 percent of all funds allocated for public spending. Without launching into any lengthy explanations or clarifications as to the reasons and motives behind the allocation of funds acquired in this way, it is fitting that we should point out that in opstinas which are receiving this kind of supplementary financial aid this practice has a direct impact on their autonomy and on the exercise of their self-management rights. Further, to greater or lesser extent, this practice also has an impact on the processes involved in the democratization of social relations in the opstinas. At worst, this amounts to a serious stumbling block which is holding up the

further development of socialist self-management and self-management democracy in the opstinas and the realization of their rights of self-management communities.

Literacy Levels Vary Markedly From Opstina to Opstina

A much more complete picture of the status of today's opstinas is presented by figures on the literacy of the population of individual opstinas and of larger geographic areas as well. Based on the data compiled as a result of the 1971 census it can be said that there are opstinas in which illiteracy is almost nonexistent or in which the number of illiterate persons is virtually negligible and is usually measured in terms of fractions of a percentage point. For example, in many of Slovenia's opstinas the percentage of the population registered as illiterate is less than 1 percent, and in some other opstinas there are virtually no illiterates.

However, in our country there are opstinas in which the percentage of the illiterate population is very high. The illiteracy problem is especially pronounced in some opstinas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. The problem of illiteracy is complicated all the more by the fact that the percentage of young people who have not received any elementary schooling is still high. Consequently, they are still illiterate as soon as they reach the point where they are trying to get started in life, this in spite of the fact that universal elementary education is a mandatory provision of the Constitution.

The level of literacy has a more or less direct impact on the process of setting up a self-managing and representative system of government in the opstinas and on the effectiveness with which this system functions in practice. On an institutional level, even though the self-managing, representative-assembly systems of government established in all opstinas are basically identical, the fact remains that, due to differences in the structure of public education and the level of education in general, it cannot be expected that all of these institutions will perform in exactly the same way.

The Distribution of Vital Public Institutions in Individual Opstinas

It often happens that the less developed opstinas do not even meet the minimum requirements in terms of their endowment with educational, cultural, health care, social service and other vitally necessary public institutions. For example, the official statistics show that there are 17 opstinas without a single movie theater and 158 opstinas with only one movie theater. There are 154 opstinas in which existing health care institutions (organizations of associated labor in the health care sector) do not have a single hospital bed and only a few doctors. As of 1972 there were 46 opstinas without a single hotel bed, while, on the other hand, there were 122 opstinas with more than 500 hotel beds.

FOOTNOTES

1. These differences were first pointed out more than 10 years ago in the Resolution of the Federal Assembly on the Socioeconomic and Political Status and Further Development of Self-management Relations in the Opstinas. of 17 December 17 December 1968. Vide SLUŽBENI LIST SFRJ NO 53/1968.
2. Most of the figures which we have cited in this article are taken from the 1968 Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia.
3. Vracar--3 km², Ljubljana-City Center--5, Stari Grad--7, Savski Venac--14, Izola--28, Zvezdara--30, Novi Grad--37, Novi Beograd--41, Piran--45, Tivat--46, and so on.
4. Knjazevac--1,202, Trebinje--1,205, Kumanovo--1,212, Banja Luka--1,235, Slavenska Pozega--1,249, Mostar--1,266, Foca--1,269 Zrenjanin--1,310, Pljevlja--1,346, Titograd--1,399, Kraljevo--1,530, Titov Veles--1,536, Gostivar--1,674, Prilep--1,675, and Bitolj--1,675 km².
5. Novi Sad, Osijek, Nis, and so on.
6. Sarajevo Novo, Savski Venac, Stari Grad, Vracar, Avezdara, Ljubljana-City Center, and so on.
7. Trebnje--214, Ptuj--212, Grosuplje--210, Slavenska Pozega--203, Ljubljana Vic-Rudnik--189, Smarje pri Jelsah--188, Gorazde--187, Krsko--185, Skofja Loka--183, Trebinje--182, Duga Resa--181, Porec--180, Kocevje--177, Maribor--175, Cernomelj--174, Sezana--172, Domzale--166, Litija--156, Jastrebarsko--156, Delnice--153, Titograd--150, Konjic--147, Ozalj--143, Visegrad--143, Kosovska Mitrovica--141, Krizevci--137, and so on.
8. Lastovo--1,210, Novigrad--2,978, Ljubinje--4,837, Vis--5,049 (according to the 1971 census).
9. Novi Sad--213,861, Nis--193,509, Split--185,047, Maribor--171,745 Rijeka--160,044, Banja Luka--158,736, Leskovac--147,487, Subotica--146,773, Osijek--143,894, and so on (these are the population figures recorded by the 1971 census, even though current populations have changed considerably due to the natural population increment, but also due to the mechanical influx of population into the aforementioned opstinas during the past 8 years.
10. Dordevic, Jovan. "Politicki sistem" [The Political System], published by the Union of Yugoslav Lawyers Associations, 1967, p 517.
11. Op. cit., p 517.

12. Ljubinje--5.5; Savnik--6.2; Sekovici--6.6; Crna Trava--7.8;
Glogovac--7.9; Merosina 8.4 and Lastovo--9.1 (in millions of dinars).
13. Novi Sad--14,705.9; Rijeka--1,512.1; Maribor--10,650.2; Split--8,893.7;
Zenica--5,775.7; Bor--5,273.1; Tuzla--5,138.6; Postojna--4,789.6;
Pristina--4,542.0; Osijek--4,431.6 million dinars.
14. Savski Venac-Belgrade--23,479.6; Ljubljana-City Center--12,472.6;
Stari Grad-Belgrade--10,500.6, and so on (in millions of dinars).
15. Kupres, Han Pijesak, Lastovo, Pecinci, Vitina, Kalesija, Mionica, Opovo,
Merosina, and so on.
16. Savnik, Zabljak, Crna Trava, Trgoviste.
17. Novi Sad--84,294, Rijeka--71,614, Maribor--70,640, Nis--65,586, Split--
62,523, and so on.
18. Dordevic, Jovan. "Politicki sistem" [The Political System], published
by the Union of Yugoslav Lawyers Associations, Belgrade, 1967, p 523.
19. Lastovo--8.3; Savnik--14.9; Ljubinje--20.8; Zabljak--23.3; Pluzine--
23.5; Trgoviste--24.6 (in millions of dinars as of 1971).
20. Stari Grad--5,020.3; Novi Sad--3,784.7; Rijeka--3,472.9; Maribor--3,114.7;
Split--3,050.8; Osijek--2,043.2, and so on (in millions of dinars as
of 1971).

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